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NEGOTIATING GENDER: 
A COMPARISON Oli' RAPE LAWS IN CANADA, 
FINLAND, AND PAKISTAN 
DANETTE C. CASHMANt 
I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Sexuality/Or humans neverJitsl is: it has 110 reality sui generous, and a 
concern with ii always brings with ti wtder social psychic issues in 
their wake. Human sexualities have to be socially produced (no human 
can eJ!er Jitst do ii), socially organized, socially maintmized and 
socially And, as cultures change, so do sexualtlies. 1 
Since the 1970s, rape has been a central theme of feminist research 
in North America. The issue has garnered volumes of papers, books, and 
theses, spanning a range of disciplines and topics including, to name just 
a few: psychoanalytical inquiries into the mind of the rapist and his 
victims; strategies of resistance and avoidance; cost-benefit analyses of 
using law as an instrument of control and sexual regulation; and, 
investigations into the competence of medical research to conoborate 
(or confute) crimes of rape. The goals underlying the feminist interest in 
rape are several. No longer content to view rape as the pathological act 
of a lone and isolated perpetrator, feminists have sought a sociological 
understanding of the meaning of rape. Feminists have also sought legal 
reform, attempting to give voice to women's experience of rape in a 
discourse that has traditionally excluded women's perspectives despite 
the fact that theirs were the bodies actually implicated in the crime. 
Feminist legal research has persuasively shown how the criminal law 
has traditionally represented and protected male interests and 
standpoints, largely ignoring the hann done to the victim. In addition to 
t The author is deeply gratefit! to the JO!lowtizg people/or he/pti1g to Jill ill the gaps it1 the 
English literature 011 Flilllish rape law: Heildd Jaatinen, Prqfessor {)(Criminal Law al Tur/at 
University, Meri Steinburg, Advocate far Umom; the Flil!lish League of Women, Pliivi 
Honkafllkia, Research Qfficer at the National Research /11sli!t1/e rf Legal Policy, a!ld Ftimish 
Law Student Tuomas Koip11/a. Special thanks lo Keplif No11siaine11, Professor ()(Legal 
The01y at Helsli1ki University. 
1 Ken Plummer, "Forward" in !irfiv note 5 at xvii. 
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the above, feminists and women's action groups have sought to develop 
new strategies of resistance and prevention. 
The importance of law in feminist discussions of rape cannot be 
underestimated. Initially motivated by what were perceived as injustices 
within the legal system, implicitly and inevitably, the feminist inquiry 
always ends where it begins, with a discursive exchange with the law. 
This, despite ever increasing demands that women look outside the law 
to find new strategies of resistance. In the modem world, law as an 
"instrument of truth,''2 to use Carol Smart's words, has become a site of 
gender conflict. The feminist inquiry into rape has clearly demonstrated 
how gender categories are both constructed and maintained through 
legal systems. But if law is a site of gender construction, it is also a site 
of gender renegotiation. 
Noticeably absent from the body of feminist literature are accounts 
of rape that are historically and culturally situated. Illich, for instance, 
argues that: 
[t]he social history of modern rape still remains to be written, in part 
because modern, sexist rape under assumptions of general conditions 
of scarcity still has not been clearly distinguished from age-old forms 
of physical, genital violence against women ... what American women 
now fear most is rape as the supreme physical expression of modem 
sexism-and sexism as an experience always tastes of this rape. I 
argue that modern rape is implicitly fostered by the obliteration of 
gender.3 
Illich recognizes that the definition, practice and experience of rape is 
socially and culturally contingent. But with few exceptions, feminist 
analyses tend to proceed from the assumption that rape is a universal 
phenomenon that produces common experiences for women. Cross-
cultural analyses, when they are done at all, become tools for verifying 
and thereby legitimating feminist conclusions.4 Cultural and historical 
2 Carol Smart, "Law's body, the Sexed Body, and Feminist Discourse" (1990) 11: 17 
Journal of Law and Sociology 194. 
3 Ivan Illich, Gender (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983) at 31-32. See also Herietta 
Moore, "The problem of explaining violence in the social science" in Penelope Harvey and 
Peter Gow, eds., Sex a!ld Violence: /ssues ti1 representatioll a!ld experie11ce (New York: 
Routledge, 1994) 13 8, who sees crisis in gender identity as a source of violence in gender 
relations. 
4 For an exception to the rule see Cecilia McCallum "Ritual and the origin of sexuality in 
Alto Xingu" in Penelope Harvey and Peter Gow, eds., Sex and Violence: /ssues i11 
representatioll and experience (New York: Routledge, 1994). 
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vanat10n has been effectively ignored and silenced in the North 
American discussions. This position is unjustified in light of Simon's 
claim that "all discourses of sexuality are inherently discourses about 
something else; sexuality rather than serving as a constant thread that 
unifies the totality r:f human experience is the ultimate dependent 
variable, requiring explanation more often than it provides explanation" 
[emphasis added].5 
The crime of rape is unique insofar as it defines deviant sexual 
activity and therefore establishes the limits and terms of n01mal 
heterosexual encounters and gender relations. It is therefore essential 
that the meaning of rape be considered in cultural specificity. This is not 
to say that cross-cultural comparison at a micro level is never 
appropriate, or that universal themes never emerge. These approaches, 
however, need to be exercized with caution, heeding the logical 
coherence of different cultural forms. If we accept feminist claims that 
rape is socially and culturally produced, then rape must be examined 
within the framework of different legal and sexual cultures. Catherine 
MacKinnon6 argues that, for feminism, (hetero )sexuality is analogous 
to the economic base in Marxism; it is the foundation upon which the 
superstructure of contemporary society is built. Even if one does not 
subscribe completely to this argument, it nevertheless illustrates the 
importance of examining the way in which different cultures understand 
and use the sexual in constructing the gender relation. Examining the 
law of rape in different cultural landscapes thus becomes an important 
area of research for feminism. 
In this paper, I analyze and compare the definition of rape in three 
different legal and sexual cultures: Finland, Pakistan, and Canada. 
Ultimately, it is an attempt to release the current feminist discourse from 
the straight-jacket of theoretical essentialism. In many ways, this work 
represents three separate undertakings, which are themselves self-
contained and self-defining. The common thread that links them, 
however, is the way in which the law of rape serves as a site of gender 
negotiation. In each case, the way in which the question of rape is 
framed, understood, and negotiated is a product of the legal culture in 
5 William Simon, Poslmodem Sexualities (London: Routledge, 1996) at xvii. 
6 Catherine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist The01y (}f the Stale (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1989). 
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which it is situated. Comparative analysis of rape law demonstrates the 
synergic interplay between law and culture and highlights the fact that 
rape as it is legally defined is culturally contingent. The law of rape not 
only impacts on how rape is culturally understood, but the legal culture 
in which the law is situated sets the parameters of negotiation and 
reform. Thus, in Canada, liberal legalism has been a defining feature in 
the evolution of the rape laws. In Finland, the emergence of 'women's 
law' has, in a legopolitical climate of 'gender harmony', created a 
discursive space for feminists to begin to address issues of violence 
against women. And, in Pakistan, the current trends towards 
Islamization poses special challenges for the way in which women are 
able to articulate crimes of sexual violence. Western frames of 
reference, though informative, can ultimately be counterproductive if 
they are not properly tailored, to meet the cultural and legal 
requirements of Islam including recognition of the special status that 
women's sexuality plays in maintaining the social order. In the pages 
that follow, I will undertake to examine the intersection of law and 
culture in the legal definition of rape. In each of the cases studies, rape 
law emerges as a site of gender negotiation, but, as will be demonstrated, 
the issues surrounding legal ref01m are culturally unique in te1ms of 
both content and process. 
II. THE LAW OF RAPE IN CANADA: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The area where co11tempormy/e1111i1ism has sz(/fered the most se!f-
il?f!icted damage is rape. What began as a l!Sf!fitl sensitization o.fpolice 
officers, prosecutors, a!7d judges to the clatins qf authe!7tic rape 
victims turned into a hallucinat01y owrextensio11 qf the definition of 
rape to cover eve1y u11pleasa11t or embarrassti1g sexual e11coz111ter. 
Rape became the cnine qf cnines, overshadow1i1g all qf the wars, 
massacres, and disasters o.f wor!d history. The femimst obsession with 
rape as a symbol ofmalefamale relations is irrational and delusional. 
From the perspective qfthe fi1ture, this period tiz America will look like 
a reign qfmass psychosis, like that o.f the Salem witch trials. 7 
7 Camille Paglia, Vamps & Tramps (New York: Vintage Books, 1994) at 24. 
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Reforming rape and sexual assault law has been a central issue for 
Canadian women's groups since the 1970s. Informed by the rape debate 
in the United States, one of the central philosophical issues for feminists 
has been 'what are the characteristics of the offending act that transform 
it from sex into rape.' This has been a divisive issue for feminist 
academics. Early strategies for reform involved de-emphasizing the 
sexual nature of the act and defining rape as a violent attack, analogous 
to other types of assault. But later feminists, responding to this 
definition, have argued that the problem of rape is really a problem of 
the way gender is constructed, and produced, in society. Society cannot 
stop rape until gender relations are reconstructed. As a result, this later 
generation of feminist have sought to re-establish rape as a sexual crime. 
This strategy, however, has been criticized by feminists committed to 
the liberal ideal. An interesting aspect of evolution of Canadian rape law 
is the way in which legislators have responded to feminist criticisms by 
reconstituting old conceptual forms, in particular liberal legalism. 
Laws Historical Perspective 
Prior to 1983, rape in Canada was defined as 'sexual intercourse by 
a male person with a female person who is not his wife without her 
consent, or with her consent if the consent was extorted by threats of fear 
or bodily hann, is obtained by personating her husband, or by false 
representations of the nature and quality of the act.' 8 'Indecent Assault 
of a Female' and 'Indecent Assault of a Man by a Man' were both 
separate categories of offences. In general, however, these latter 
provisions were reserved for situations of sexual contact with children 
where no force was used. 9 With some exceptions, the Canadian 
legislation reflected the way in which rape was dealt with in other 
western jurisdictions, most notably in the United States. Where drafting 
differences existed, similar patterns of judicial interpretation, as well as 
common rules of evidence, meant that the crime of rape was similarly 
treated among common law jurisdictions. 
During the 1970s and 80s, the subject of rape was taken up as a 
cause of feminism, and the rape law itself became a source of 
8 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Crim1i10! Low: Sexual Offe11ces, 1978 at 55. 
9 Ibid. at 18-9. 
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controversy for women's groups, not only in Canada, but in England, 10 
Australia, 11 and the United States.12 Criticism was launched at the basic 
legal definition of rape, as well as at the law of evidence insofar as it 
impacted on the definitional landscape. Feminists attacked the basic 
definition of rape, as it emerged from the legislative texts, common law 
doctrines and rules of evidence. The central issue was the way in which 
the legal definition of rape both directly and indirectly represented male 
perspectives and interests, rather than those of the victim. 13 
Feminists objected to what they perceived as the gender inequities 
of the rape provisions. For women's groups who based their demands 
for reform on liberal principles of individual autonomy, self-
determination, and equality, the fact that rape, as it was legally defined, 
could only be perpetrated by a man on a woman, had particular symbolic 
significance. Inequality with respect to culpability could not be justified 
within a liberal framework. Furthermore, feminists saw the language of 
rape as connotatively emphasizing the act of sexual penetration and thus 
privileging a male perspective with respect to the essential nature of 
sexual crimes. The marital exemption was also a prime target of 
criticism. Typically, the justifications that were offered for the exception 
included: that a rape charge would disrupt familial hannony; that, in an 
era before no-fault divorce, a change in the legislation could lead to false 
accusations; and finally that rape within the context of mmTiage would 
be too difficult to prove. For women's groups, however, the fact that 
there was no legal recourse for a woman who had been raped by her 
husband was an affront to a woman's self-determination and physical 
integrity. Moreover, at a symbolic level, women objected to the law's 
implied notion that, upon marriage, women were consenting to all future 
acts of intercourse. Thus, by shifting to a generic sexual assault 
10 See Lees, Carnal Knowledge: Rape 011 Trial (New York: Peguin Books, 1997). 
11 See Gail Mason, "Reforming the law of rape: incursions into the masculinist sanctum" in 
Diane Kirkby, ed., Sex; Fower and ./Nslice: Historical Perspectives of Law in Allstralia (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 50. 
12 See Mary Ann Largen, "Rape-Law Reform: An Analysis" in Ann Wolbe1i Burgess, ed., 
Rape and Sexual Assault H (New York: Garland Publishing, I 988) 271. 
13 For a general examination of the evolution of the legislative reform in Canada see: 
Loreen Snider, "Legal Reform and Social Control: the Dangers of Abolishing Rape" ( 1985) 13 
International Journal of the Sociology of Law 337; Jennifer Temkin, "Women, Rape and Law 
Refonn" in Sy Ivana Tomaselli & Roy Potier, eds., Rape (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986). 
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provision, which emphasized the violent nature of rape, women hoped 
to overcome the gender discrimination inherent in the law. 
It should be noted that during this early period of reform, the notion 
of consent was treated as relatively unproblematic. Lack of consent 
(which could ordinarily be discerned by the fact that violence was used) 
was seen to be the definitional element of the crime - it was what 
transformed ordinary sex into the sexual attack. What eventually did 
become an issue for reformers, however, was the way in which consent 
was demonstrated in court, that is the way sexual history, general 
lifestyle, and complainant character evidence was used to demonstrate 
that a woman was, in some senses, 'unrapable.' Issues related to consent 
also arose in the context of required fault. At common law, the Crown 
must prove that the accused had subjective knowledge of the lack of 
consent. Thus, there is no requirement that a mistake with respect to 
consent be a reasonable one. 14 A question therefore arises as to whether 
subjective knowledge is the appropriate standard of fault or whether 
something less should be required. 15 Debate over the appropriateness of 
the consent requirement itself, however, has largely only occurred 
outside of the legal discourse. 
Women's demands for reform extended not only to the legislative 
definitions of the offence, but also to the laws of evidence insofar as they 
impacted on the basic definitional issue. The first issue of concern was 
in regards to the common law doctrines of 'corroboration' and 'recent 
complaint'. Under the doctrine of corroboration, an accused could not be 
convicted unless the victim could produce corroboratory evidence, such 
as bruises or a witness to the act, which could support her testimony or 
version of events. Under the doctrine of recent complaint, juries were 
warned about the general unreliability of testimony from a complainant 
who failed to rep01i an attack in a timely manner. A second area of 
concern was the unadulterated use of the victim's sexual history as 
evidence of consent. Together, victim's advocates argued, these rules of 
evidence created 'rape myths' which ultimately defined rape in a way 
14 See the Supreme Court's decision in: R. v. Pappajohn [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120, where it was 
affirmed that mistaken belief in consent can fonn the basis of a defense. It was, however, held 
that there needed to be an "air of reality" to the defense before it could be presented to the jury. 
15 In R v. Scmsgarel [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570, the Supreme Comt held that "willful blindness" 
could constitute the mental element of rape. 
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that protected male, rather than the victim's, interests. These myths 
included, among others, that 'woman often lie about being raped', that 
'only chaste women can be raped,' that 'when a women says no, she can 
be seduced into sex,' and that 'a women consents when she doesn't 
resist.' 
As has already been stated, during the 1970s and 80s, rape became 
a central issue for feminist scholarship. Criticisms directed at specific 
pieces of legislation soon led to a broader discussion of the content and 
structure of the legal system and the nature of the heterosexual 
relationship. It is necessary to understand the content of the larger 
debates in order to understand the direction that the law has taken since 
this early period. 
2. The Philosophical Debate and Emerging Feminist Strategies 
The philosophical debate in N01ih America has primarily focused 
on the (re) definition of rape or sexual assault, so that womens 
experiences formed the content of the law. The debate was spurred, in 
part, by a perceived inadequacy with respect to the way in which rape 
was handled in the criminal justice system - an inadequacy that 
manifested itself in under-reporting, low conviction rates, and a feeling 
on the part of the victim that she was being 'raped' a second time by the 
criminal justice process. With respect to this latter issue, MacKinnon 
argues that one of the reasons that women do not report incidents of rape 
is that: 
[they] cannot bear to have their personal account of sexual abuse 
reduced to a fantasy they invented, used to define them and to pleasure 
the finders of fact and the public. I think that they have a very real 
sense that their accounts are enjoyed, that others are getting pleasure 
from the first-person recounting of their pain, and that is the content of 
the humiliation at these rituals. When rape victims say they feel raped 
again on the stand, and victims of sexual harassment say they feel 
sexually harassed in adjudication, it is not exactly a metaphor. I hear 
that they - in being publicly sexually humiliated by the system, as by 
the perpetrator - are pornography. The first time it happens, it is called 
freedom; the second time, it is called justice. 16 
16 Catherine Mac Kinnon, Feminism U11mod;jled: Discourses 011 Lfe and Law (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1987) at 111. 
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MacKinnon's account of the rape trial demonstrates how: 
women come to embody the standard fantasy of the pleasure of abuse 
and sexual power. It is not just that they must repeat the violation in 
words, not that they may be judged to be lying, but that the women's 
story gives pleasure in the way that pornography gives pleasure. The 
naming of parts becomes almost a sexual act, in that it draws attention 
to the sexualized body. But her account, distorted by the cross-
questioning techniques of the defense counsel, does not only sexualize 
her, it becomes a pornographic vignette. Unfortunately for the woman 
in the dock she differs from the photograph because she is there in the 
flesh to feel her humiliation. The judge, the lawyers, the jury, and the 
public can gaze on her body and re-enact her violation in their 
imaginations. 17 
Burniller18 illustrates how these types of sexual imaginings by the 
audience are enabled by the legal discourse itself, manifested in the trial 
techniques of examination and cross-examination. The process is meant 
to "separat[ e] out the truth from the hysteria of the victim" 19 and, in the 
end, stifles the woman's ability to recount the event as she experienced 
it. Bumiller warns: 
The forms of communication that are appropriate in a courtroom and 
that are disseminated by the media conform to conventions of the 
'public discourse' of news reporiing and the 'professional discourse' 
of criminal procedure. If reformers strive toward transforming the 
social construction of rape, even abandoning the model of consent, 
then changes in the public understanding of the crime may only come 
about with challenges to the dominance of the legal discourse.20 
From its inception, feminist writing on the topic involved a broad 
inquiry into the interaction between the crime of rape and the larger 
social structures that construct women as the victims of rape. The early 
research focused on the way in which traditional ideas of gender 
sexuality for instance, man as (nonnatively?) sexually aggressive and 
17 Carol Smart, Fem1ilislll 011d the Power o/low (New York: Routledge, 1989). 
18 Kristin Bumiller, "Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence against Women in 
Legal Culture" in Martha Fineman & Nancy Thomadsen, eds., Al the Boundaries o/ Low: 
Fellltilism a11d legal The01y (New York Routledge, 1991) 95. 
19 Ibid at 108. 
20 /bidat 110. 
NEGOTIATING GENDER ... 129 
women as (normatively?) sexually passive21 - became implicated in 
legal definitions and procedures. In addition, early feminist22 writing 
demonstrated the way in which rape laws have traditionally represented 
male interests and perspectives.23 An inquiry into the social and cultural 
aspects of rape eventually led feminists to the problem of what 
distinguished rape, from a woman's point of view, from normal 
heterosexual acts. Traditionally the law solved this problem by 
categorizing women as rapable or non-rapable, and, for the fonner, rape 
occurred in the context of extra-marital intercourse. Drawing on the 
work of Anna Clark, Smart argues: 
consent was crucial in the nineteenth century, but the meaning of that 
consent is quite different than the meaning of consent now ... consent 
was not a matter of woman's will or whether she resisted or not. Rather 
consent was a matter of how she conducted herself, whether she - by 
her conduct - made it clear that she was the sexual prope1ty of her 
husband or her father or the common property of all men. So if a 
woman was deemed to be unchaste, it did not matter whether she 
clearly resisted the rape, she had consented at a general level.24 
Smart goes on to argue that the legal (and social?) context of rape has 
changed so that "consent and non-consent are no longer the self-evident 
properties of certain categories of women. Consent is being 
psychologized, it is becoming the state of mind which can be attributed 
to all or any women. To this extent rape is being democratized."25 Thus, 
the distinguishing features of sexual assault have become a central issue 
for feminist scholars. As Griffin notes, "[t]hough the law of rape 
attempts to make clear a division between rape and sexual intercourse, in 
fact, the courts find it difficult to distinguish between a case where the 
21 This idea has been extensively written about both within and outside of legal 
discourse. See, for instance, Susan Edwards Female Sexuality a11cl !he law (Oxford: Maitin 
Robertson, 1981) and Susan Brownmiller's seminal work Agai11sl Our Will· Men. Jf/ome11 
a11cl Rape (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975). 
22 I tend to see the rape discourse as an evolution, but not in the sense of linear 
development or the simple accumulation of knowledge, but rather as a continual taking up 
and responding to other positions, a process that ultimately leaves no position unmodified 
or unchanged. 
23 Brownmiller, supra note 21. 
24 Supra note 17 at 41 . 
25 Ibid 
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decision to copulate was mutual and where a man forced himself upon 
his partner." 26 
The relationship between rape and normal heterosexual intercourse 
has been a source of controversy and has, to some extent, caused a rift in 
the feminist community. Burgess-Jackson27 has discerned two streams 
of thought in the feminist rape debate- those who see rape as battery and 
those who see rape as degradation. From his perspective, both of these 
factions are participating in what he calls "persuasive redefinition" -
using the emotive content of the language of rape to redefine its 
substantive qualities. For the liberal feminist, who defines the offensive 
act as battery, rape is viewed as deviant sexual activity in which an 
individual's freedom to choose is suspended, where the victim becomes 
an object, or an instrument of use, for the rapist. Thus, lack of consent -
the bypassing of the victim's subjectivity becomes the defining feature 
of the crime of rape. The radical feminist, who defines rape as 
degradation, also sees the objectification of women as what is at stake in 
the crime of rape. But this objectification is not seen as an act of 
deviance, but, rather, as integral to the normal heterosexual relationship, 
which is always marked by power difference. Lack of consent cannot be 
the defining feature of rape because, from the radical perspective, 
consent is always coerced 
Feminists are also divided on the issue of whether rape is about 
'sex' or 'violence.' In order to achieve a critical standpoint with respect 
to the traditional cultural and legal definitions of rape, early feminist 
writings focused on the subjective consequences of a rape event for the 
individual women, leading to a theoretical position that rape is an act of 
'aggression' or 'violence' and that what is at stake in the crime ofrape is 
also what is at stake in any other type of assault. Although this position 
gained favour by legal refonners, it has become highly controversial in 
the more philosophical discourses. Critics argue that "the complex 
relations between sexuality and power is underscored by the fact that 
rape, and the fear of rape, are experienced by women sexually, not as 
26 Susan Griffin, "Rape: the All-American Crime" in Mary Vetterling-Braggin, Frederick 
Elliston & Jane English, eds., Femtidsm and Philosophy (New Jersey: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1977) 313 at 318. 
27 Keith Burgess-Jackson, Rape: A Philosophical l11J!estigation (Vermont: Dartmouth 
Publishing, 1996). 
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domination."28 Smart says that it is "a dubious feminist strategy that, in 
finding sex problematic, attempts to transpose it into violence as 
something easier to deal with. It overlooks that violence is not violence 
if it is sexualized, or that violence is exonerated if pleasure can be 
achieved."29 To view rape as about violence, rather than sex, is seen as a 
mistake because rape cannot simply be viewed as a tragic event in the 
life of the particular woman involved. Rather it is representative of, 
although perhaps in its extreme form, the heterosexual relation. To 
divorce sex from rape is dangerous because it makes invisible the fact 
that "rape is a man's act, whether it is a male or a female man and 
whether it is a man relatively permanently or relatively temporarily; and 
being raped is a woman's experience whether it is a female or a male 
woman and whether it is relatively permanently or relatively 
temporarily."30 MacKinnon, who is perhaps the modem spokeswoman 
for the 'rape is sex' position, argues: 
If sexuality is central to women's definition and forced sex is central to 
sexuality, rape is indigenous, not exceptional to women's condition. In 
feminist analysis, a rape is not an isolated event or moral transgression 
or individual interchange gone wrong but an act of terrorism and 
torture within a systemic context of group subjugation, like 
lynching. 31 
In other words, rape is a consequence of a social context that treats 
sexuality in terms of gendered, hierarchical nonns. 32 For McKinnon, 
Karl Marx was wrong - sex, and not economics, is the base upon which 
the social superstructure of Western society is built. 
To expend much energy on the 'violence vs. sex' debate is, to some 
extent, to pursue a red herring. Rape is, of course, both. Marcus defines 
rape as a "sexualized and gendered attack which imposes sexual 
28 Winfred Woodhull, "Sexuality, Power and the Question of Rape" in Irene Diamond and 
Lee Quinby, eds., Femtilism & Foucault: Rejlec!io11 011 Resistance (Boston: Northeastern 
University Press, 1988) 167 atl 71. 
29 Supra note 17 at 46. 
3° Carolyn Shafer & Marilyn Frye, "Rape and Respect" in Mmy Vetterling-Braggin et. al., 
eds., Femti1is111 a11d Flu!osop!ty (New Jersey Rowman and Littlefield, 1977) 333 at 333. 
31 note 16 at 172. 
32 This does not mean that rape wouldn't occur in other social settings, but it would have a 
different meaning. Just as sexuality is socially constructed, the meaning of rape is necessarily 
tied to that construction. 
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difference along the lines of violence. "33 For the early feminists, 
however, it was necessary to disengage rape from legal and cultural 
norms that overdetermined its defining characteristics as sexual, where 
sexuality was understood from the male perspective. Strategically, then, 
feminists began to focus their analysis on the very real aspects of 
violence and aggression in the sexual attack. Their project was 
successful in initiating legislative reform, in large part, because it was 
compatible with the prevailing ideology of liberalism: the protection of 
woman's bodies and self-integrity was seen as a natural extension of the 
law. Lacey argues that "[i]n a modem liberal system, the most obviously 
relevant interest - the one which forms the normative framework for 
many academic commentaries on the sexual offences, is sexual 
autonomy the freedom to determine one's own sexual experiences, to 
choose how and with whom one expresses oneself sexually."34 What has 
emerged since that early period, however, is a shift in emphasis to the 
broader issues of how rape is actually produced in and through culture. 
Foa, for instance, argues: 
against those who maintain that the special wrongness of rape arises 
from and is completely explained by a societal refusal to recognize 
women as people ... The special wrongness of rape is due to, and is only 
an exaggeration of, the wrongness of our sexual interactions in 
general. Thus, a clear analysis of the special wrongness of rape will 
help indicate some of the essential features of healthy, non-rapine 
sexual interactions. 35 
This shift in emphasis, like the earlier shift to rape-as-violence, should 
be seen as a strategic response to current cultural norms. The strategy is, 
of course, shaped by the current discursive climate, of which the rape-
as-violence discourse is part. The following passage is illustrative: 
The refusal to link the crime to sex comes in response to the 
reactiona1y claim that rape is the inevitable result of a supposedly 
innate male aggressivity coupled with an uncontrollable sexual need. 
However, the feminist counterargument ultimately rests on a notion of 
33 Sharon Marcus "Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory of Politics and Rape 
Prevention" in Judith Butler & Joan Scott, eds., Femi11isl.r Theorize the Political (New York: 
Routledge, 1992) 385 at 397. 
34 Nicola Lacey "Unspeakable Subjects, Impossible Rights: Feminism, Sex and Criminal 
Law" Legal The01y Workshop Series (University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, 1997) at 4. 
35 Pamela Foa, "What's Wrong with Rape" in Mary Vetterling-Braggin et. al., eds., 
Feminism a11d Philosophy (New Jersey Rowman and Littlefield, 1977) 34 7 at 34 7. 
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power divorced from sex, as if sex preexisted the social, from which 
power is said to derive. In doing so, it falls prey to the ruse of power 
cited by Foucault, namely, the designation of "sex as a biological or 
ontological given whose function is to guarantee that sexuality appear 
to have its origin outside of and prior to power. To accept this 
theoretical alibi is thus unwittingly to comply with the power one aims 
to elude.36 
The current strategy is thus to provide a broader critique of gendered 
power than the sex-as-violence discourse will allow. 
For critics like Catherine MacKinnon and Carol Smart, social 
institutions in general, and the law in particular, normalize "dominator 
models"37 of sexual interaction by eroticizing them. Recognizing the 
difficulties inherent in current legal structures, however, cannot lead to 
social determinism if it is to achieve its strategic purpose. As Sawacki 
argues: 
The relationship between the individual and society is not pictured as 
one of social determination-complete socialization. Socialization 
emerges as a theoretical project that is never fully realized in practice. 
Therefore, social constructionism need not imply social determinism. 
In such a relational view of personal identity, one's interests are a 
function of one's place in the social field at a particular time, not 
given. They are constantly open to change and contestation. 38 
In order to take up the challenge posed by modem radical rape theory, 
the issue that must be addressed by legal discourse is not only 'how is 
law informed and determined by cultural norms of sexuality and 
gender,' but 'how, as an instrument of the social, can the law be used to 
produce cultural norms.' Marcus 39 defines rape as a "scripted 
interaction" and suggests that women, in strategies of rape prevention, 
attempt to disrupt the script. She advises women, for instance, to 
disregard their traditional scripted role as victim or "subject of fear" and 
to treat the rape event as a "subject-to-subject" encounter, similar to a 
physical assault between men. She tells women to avoid seeing the penis 
36 Woodhull, s1ipranote 29 atl70. 
37 I borrow this term from Riane Eisler Sacred Pleasure: Sex, 1Wy1/? and !l!e Politics 0/1/Je 
lJody New Pat/?s lo Power and Low (San Francisco: Harper, I 995). 
38 Jana Sawicki, "Identity, Politics and Sexual Freedom" in Irene Diamond & Lee Quinby, 
eds., Femi11ism & Foucault: Rejleclio11s 011 Resistance (Boston: Northeastern University 
Press, 1988) 177 at 184. 
39 Stipra note 34. 
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as an "indestructible weapon that cannot help but rape'', but rather to 
view it as a source of vulnerability. Marcus tells the tale of one woman 
who, in the midst of her assault grabbed her assailant's penis and 
threatened to "break it off', causing him to lose his erection and run off. 
The law, of course, has been complicit in creating the social script of 
rape. The question now becomes can the law be used as an 'instrument 
of disruption,' 'a site of resistance,' or more particularly, 'a site for the 
renegotiation of the social scripts of sexuality and gender.' 
It is a matter of some controversy whether law can and should be 
used as a site of renegotiation for broader gender relationships. 
Bumiller, for instance, argues that such a possibility would require 
"challenging the dominance of the legal discourse" and this idea poses a 
problem for feminists who are committed to the liberal ideal. As has 
already been argued, the success of the first wave of legal refonns was 
due, in large part, because of its consistency with liberal legalism and 
there is, therefore a reluctance to stray too far from liberal principles. 
Moreover, there seems to be an unarticulated fear among many 
women's groups that a move away from liberalism, as a conceptual 
framework, may have the effect of reconstituting traditional legal forms. 
Many feminists, however, question the adequacy of liberal forms. 
Nedelsky argues that "[f]eminism appears equivocal in it stance toward 
liberalism because it simultaneously demands a respect for women's 
selfhood and rejects the language and assumptions of individual rights 
that have been our culture's primary means of expressing and enforcing 
respect for selfhood."40 
Lacey and Bumiller both argue that the liberal principles that form 
the foundations of modern rape laws are inherently problematic. Lacey 
states: 
It is an image of the body as territory, in the sense of both bounded 
space and property; divorced from reason and emotion, bodies are 
boundaries which separate autonomous individuals rather than aspects 
of lived subjectivity within which subjects relate to one another. This 
atomistic vision marginalises values which one might hope to see 
criminal protect.41 
40 Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities" in 
Allan Hutchinson & Leslie Green, eds., Law and the Community: The End cf /11dividua!ism 
(Toronto: Carswell, 1989) at 220 .. 
41 Supra note 35. 
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For Lacey, the liberal construct of the "disembodied" and "atomistic" 
subject does not serve to adequately protect those things that society 
(women?) values most about the sexual encounter: "self-expression, 
connection, intimacy, relationship."42 For Bumiller, not only is the law 
inadequate in its protection, but also potentially dangerous: 
legal regulations in which the law appears to be protecting the ten-itory 
of the self (ie., pornography and sexual assault) can be seen as creating 
the social space to inscribe bodies with sexual fears and dangers of the 
epidemic. The question becomes not how the body matters in legal 
discourse, but how dangerous the law might become to its embodied 
subjects. 43 
Bumiller recognizes that it is the institution of rape that serves to oppress 
women and deeply embedded within this institution is the legal 
treatment of rape. Bumiller also recognizes, however, the possibilities 
that law reform offers: 
once the body is potentially seen as the site of oppression, then the law 
is challenged to take into account the effect of "living" in a body 
marked as different. For the law to see bodily difference, it would have 
to bring into view the different experiences of both victims and 
perpetrators of acts of oppression.44 
For both Bumiller and Lacey, the possibilities of the law serving as a site 
of gender renegotiation are tied to a move from 'subject' to 
'subjectivity.' The question becomes can such a move take place within 
existing legal forms. Nedelsky's words are instructive here when she 
states: 
[f]eminism requires a new conception of autonomy. The prevailing 
conception stands at the core of liberal theory and calTies with it the 
individualism characteristic of liberalism. Such a conception cannot 
meet the aspirations of feminist theory and is inconsistent with its 
methodology. The basic value of autonomy is however, central to 
feminism. Feminist theory must retain the value while rejecting its 
liberal incarnation.45 
42 /bid. at 5. 
43 Kristin Burniller, "Body Images: How does the Body Matter in the Legal Imagination" 
in Bryant Garth & Austin Sarat, eds., How does the Low Motter.? (Illinois: Northwestern 
University Press, 1998) 145 at 159. 
44/bid. at 153. 
45 St.t,<?ro note 40 at 219. 
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3. Legal Reform in a Culture of Liberal Legalism 
The revised sexual assault provisions were finally enacted in 1985 
and the new legislation was comprehensive with respect to the way it 
has responded to women's early critiques.46 The 'rape' provision has 
been repealed and replaced with a gender-neutral, three-tiered 'sexual 
assault' law. The legislation distinguishes between three types of sexual 
assault based on the level of violence used. The marital exception has 
been eliminated and the act of penetration is no longer required. In 
addition, the legislation includes a series of 'rape shield' provisions, 
which are meant to preclude the defense from introducing irrelevant 
sexual history evidence, as well as to limit the use to which such 
evidence in the event that it is ultimately admitted.47 Finally, the 
corroboration48 and recent complaint doctrines49 have been abrogated. 
Consent has remained an explicit element, but in the cmTent legislation 
is deemed to be invalid when brought about by force or threat thereof, by 
fraud or by the exercise thereof. In 1992, the government again amended 
the sexual assault provisions to include: an articulation of circumstances 
in which the victim's consent would be vitiated;50 limitations with 
respect to the circumstances in which the accused could make use of the 
mistaken belief in consent defense;51 and, a reworking of the 'rape 
shield' provisions in response to a declaration by the court of 
unconstitutionality. 52 In 1997, legislators have also introduced a series 
of new provisions relating to the production and use of the 
complainant's psychiatric records. 53 
From a legislative standpoint, the reforms directly responded to 
and met the demands placed on them by women's groups. Stuart says of 
the 1992 reforms: "the process was a partisan one, with the voices of 
men, no doubt for the first time in the history of the development of 
46 Cni11i11a/ Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.19 (3d Supp), s.10. 
47 Cni11i11a! Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.19 (3d Supp), s.12. 
48 Cni11inal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.19 (3d Supp), s.11. 
49 Crimli1al Code. R.S.C. 1985, c.19 (3d Supp), s.11. 
5° Cnimi1a/ Code, 1992, c.38, s.2. 
51 Cninina/ Code, 1992, c.38, s.2. 
52 0-iminal Code, 1992, c.38, s.1. 
53 Cni11inal Code, 1997, c.30, s.1. These provisions were introduced to replace provisions 
enacted in 1985, which were held to be unconstitutional in R. v. O'Co1111or [1995] 4 
S.C.R.411. 
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Canadian criminal law, largely excluded."54 But the legal definition of 
sexual assault is not dependent exclusively on the legislative texts. 
Judicial interpretation and elaboration of the law are also important, and 
can often put a halt to statut01y reform. Vandervort states: 
In Canada a strong common law tradition and the preservation of 
common law defenses, insofar as these are not inconsistent with 
statutory provisions, tends to encourage deference to customary norms 
and dominant social interests in the interpretation and enforcement of 
statute law.55 
With respect to the judicial interpretation of the law, three general areas 
of concern emerge: fault, relevance, and consent. 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that there must be 
subjective fault in order to convict an accused of sexual assault. Thus the 
accused must either have actual knowledge of the victim's lack of 
consent, or be reckless or willfully blind56 to such knowledge. In R. v. 
Pappqjohn, 57 the court confirmed that subjective fault is a required 
element and that the defense of 'honest but mistaken belief is simply an 
abrogation of the required fault. One caveat, however, is that before a 
defense of mistaken belief goes to the jury, there would have to be an 'air 
of reality' to the defense. In practice, then, there is a shift in evidentiary 
burden to the accused with respect to the issue of fault. 
Many argue that subjective fault is an inappropriate measure of 
guilt for sexual assault. Stuart suggests that "[t]he time has arrived for 
Parliament to declare some criminal responsibility for objectively 
unreasonable sexual behaviour,''58 although he does not believe the 
"stigma" of sexual assault should be so attached. 59 Archard argues that 
"men have a duty to take reasonable care lest women do not consent."60 
Archard maintains the impossibility a man being unaware of the 
particular character of the intercourse in which he is engaging as this is 
5" Don Stuart, Ccmaditm Crimillal Law: A T!·eatise (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) at 273. 
55 Lucinda Vandervo1i, "Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea" 
(1987) 2 Canadian Journal Of Woman and the Law 233 at 240. 
56 See R. v. Sa11sregret, supra note 15. This ruling has not been incorporated into the 
legislative text. 
57 S!!pra note 14. 
58 Supra note 54 at 275. 
59 /bid. at 277. 
60 David Archard, Sexual Co!lsent (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998) at 145. 
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something that can be easily judged in terms of "pleasurability, ease, 
duration, awkwardness, and so on";61 in other words, the lack of consent 
becomes abundantly clear through a woman's body language. In 
addition, a man can desist from intercourse with little or no cost to 
himself, while the costs of forcing or coercing unconsented sex on a 
woman are considerable. Archard argues that men should exercize care 
by "being sensitive to a lack of evidence on the part of a 
woman, ... evidence [which] is palpable, or ... can be made so if men take 
certain measures."62 
Section 2 73 .2(b) of the Criminal Code prohibits the accused from 
raising the issue of honest but mistaken belief if he "did not take 
reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, 
to ascertain that the complainant was consenting." This provision seems 
to be creating an objective standard with respect to fault. Stuart argues 
that the provision raises a constitutional question because it is an 
objective standard that "does not require a marked departure from the 
objective norm."63 The issue of the way in which section 273.2(b) 
impacts upon the whole of the sexual assault provisions, however, 
particularly with respect to issue of the required fault, has not yet been 
directly dealt with by the court. The explicit move from a subjective to 
an objective standard, however, will be a difficult one for the court. 
Burgess-Jackson states: 
on no other aspect of rape law is the disagreement between liberals and 
radicals clearer - and for that reason more politically charged - than 
the mental state necessary for criminal liability. The disagreement 
over me17s rea raises large, complex, and difficult issues, some 
conceptual and some evaluative, concerning the purpose of the 
criminal law, the comparative importance in that body of law of 
harmful results and culpable mindsets, and the appropriate 
punishment for the different results and mindsets.64 
Liberalism as a theory seeks to protect the individual, qua individual, 
from the zeal of various majorities and from political and legal 
pressures to use individuals as a means to collective ends, such as the 
prevention of crime. The doctrine of me11s rea is designed and 
functions, at least in part, to ensure that only those individuals who are 
61 /bid. at 144. 
62 Ibid. at 145. 
63 Supra note 54 at 278. 
64 Supra note 28 at 137. 
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both deten-able and deserving of punishment are punished. It seeks to 
treat individual fairly, taking into account their particularities and the 
details of their conduct. The law of rape, like the law of battery 
incorporates this mental element, as one would expect if the liberal 
the01y has been instrumental in shaping it [emphasis added].65 
Discarding the subjective element of fault, particularly in an offence that 
is as politically charged as sexual assault, is an attack on the discourse of 
liberal legalism itself. 
Another area of concern for law reformers involves the 
admissibility of evidence relating to the complainant's sexual history, 
lifestyle, and therapeutic history. The rape shield provisions 
substantially curtail the admissibility of this evidence, but the Supreme 
Court has thrice struck down these laws on the basis that they infringed 
the accused's right to full answer and defense.66 In R. v. Oslin,67 the 
Court demonstrated a willingness to uphold the current legislative 
provisions limiting the use of sexual history evidence provided that 
there was residual discretion granted to the trial judge to admit the 
evidence where "probative value outweighed prejudice." In the recent 
case of R v. Mtlls, 68 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
the latest Criminal Code provisions restricting defense access to the 
complainant's therapeutic records on the grounds that the right to full 
answer and defence in the context of sexual assault cases cannot be 
defined without reference to the complainant's equality and privacy 
rights. The legislative provisions considered by the court in both Oslin 
and Mtlls instruct the trial judge to balance the defendant's and the 
complainant's constitutional rights. 69 In balancing these rights and 
65 Ibid. at 60 
66 The Supreme Court in both ForJyt!te v. /?. (1980), 53 C.C.C. (2d) 225 (S.C.C.) and/?. v. 
Seaboyer [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577 strike down legislative restrictions on the admissibility of a 
complainant's sexual history for the purposes of demonstrating consent or discrediting the 
witness. Forsythe was a pre-Charter case. In R. v. 0 'Connor, the Supreme Court strikes down 
legislative restrictions pertaining to the use of a complainant's therapeutic records. 
67 [1993] 4 S.C.R. 595. 
68 [1999] S.C.J. No. 68 (QL). 
69 It was established by the co mi in Sea boyer, supra note 66 that sexual assault laws invoke 
the equality rights of women. Several reasons have been miiculated for this including: that 
sexual assault is disproportionately a crime perpetrated by men against women; that gender 
stereotypes are often associated with the prosecution of the crime; and that as a result of the 
legal treatment of rape, women's right to privacy is disproportionately encroached upon when 
rape is compared to other types of offenses. 
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weighing the probative value of the evidence, the trial judge is not 
permitted to use lines of reasoning that are based on "groundless myth 
and fantasized stereotypes."70 However, the grant of judicial discretion 
remains problematic. 
The problem with judicial discretion is twofold. First, the 
accused's Constitutional rights to full answer and defense have 
generally taken precedence over the rights of the victim. For the last 
several years, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the accused 
right to full answer and defense needs to be balanced against the 
complainant's right to equality and privacy.71 But, until recently, in the 
hierarchy of Chaiier rights, the accused rights to full answer and defense 
have generally prevailed. Dawson argues that the jurisprudence 
surrounding the accused's right to full answer and defense is legitimated 
on notions of liberal legalism which are inherently androcentric, despite 
pretensions to gender neutrality. She argues that "the 'constitutional 
right to raise a doubt' on behalf of the individual accused appears to 
overlook the collective origins and meaning of evidence."72 To 
overcome this dilemma, Dawson maintains that the legislative purpose 
of the rape shield provisions gender equality - must be incorporated 
into the analysis of fundamental justice and the accused's right to a fair 
trial, at least in the context of a gendered crime of rape. Implicit in her 
argument is the idea that women's perceptions of what is relevant must 
be accounted for. This may mean shifting emphasis from values of 
individualism, rationality and logic, which are traditionally associated 
with liberal legalism to values of community responsibility and 
emotions of care and connection. This shift in emphasis would give new 
content to the meaning of 'fair trial', 'fundamental justice', and 
'standards of relevance.' Recently, the Supreme Court has held that the 
content of 'fair trial', 'full answer and defense' and 'fundamental 
justice' in sexual assault cases are to be informed by the equality rights 
70 The existence of "rape myths" in criminal prosecutions of such offenses was first 
identified in Seabo.yer, ibid. 
71 The court explicilty recognized this need to balance for the first time in R. v. 0 'Connor, 
supra note 15. The issue in 0 'C01morwas whether and how an accused in a sexual assault case 
should be able to gain access to the complainant's counseling and medical records where such 
records are in the hands of a third party and are not a pati of the case to meet. 
72 T. Brettel Dawson, "Sexual Assault Law and Past Sexual Conduct of Primary Witnesses: 
The Construction of Relevance" (1988) 2 Canadian Journal of Women's Issues 310. 
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of the complainant. 73 Thus, the equality rights of the victim in cases of 
sexual assault have now been constitutionalized and given status 
equivalent to the rights of the accused. How the Mz'fls decision will 
impact on that trial judge's use of discretion when balancing the rights in 
any particular case remains to be seen. 
The second problem with judicial discretion is the tendency for 
judges to incorporate old legal forms into the new law. In enacting the 
new sexual assault provisions, the legislators intended to create a new 
legal regime in order to overcome culturally embedded notions of rape. 
Arguably, judges are also influenced by the culture's rape myths and, as 
a result, these myths impact on the exercise of judicial discretion. The 
way in which rape myths can impact on legal (rather then purely factual) 
findings is illustrated in the recent the case of R. v. Ewanchu!c 74 where 
the issue before the court was the legal definition of consent. In the 
Court of Appeal, McClung J.A., setting the context for his decision, 
stated that: "it must be pointed out that the complainant did not present 
herself to Ewanchuk or enter his trailer in a bonnet and crinolines;"75 
and, that "she was the mother of a six-month-old baby and that, along 
with her boyfriend, she shared an apartment with another couple."76 
Although this decision was not about evidence admissibility, it 
demonstrates how judges often interpret the law in a way that imports 
traditional understandings of rape and sexual assault. In her decision, 
L'Heureux-Dube J. states: 
Even though McClung J.A. assetied that he had no intention of 
denigrating the complainant, one might wonder why he felt necessary 
to point out these aspects of the trial record. Could it be to express that 
the complainant is not a virgin? Or that she is a person of questionable 
moral character because she is not married and lives with her 
boyfriend and another couple? These comments made by an appellate 
judge help reinforce the myth that under such circumstances, either the 
complainant is less w01ihy of belief, she invited the sexual assault, or 
her sexual experience signals probable consent to further sexual 
activity. Based on those attributed assumptions, the implication is that 
if the complainant mticulates her lack of consent by saying "no," she 
73 R. v. Mills, supra note 68. 
74 R. v. Ewa11chuk [1999) S.C.J. No 10. 
75 ibid at para 88. 
76 ibid. 
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really does not mean it and even if she does, her refusal cannot be 
taken as seriously as if she were a girl of "good" moral character. 77 
The final area relevant to law reform is with respect to the issue of 
consent. Consent seems to be firmly established within the legal 
discourse, if not the philosophical one, as the defining feature of the 
crime of rape. Nevertheless, consent cannot be seen as unproblematic. 
The Criminal Code lays out circumstances in which the victim's consent 
is vitiated, that is circumstances in which she cannot consent, for 
instance, if she is in a state of intoxication. But the deeper meaning of 
consent is not to be found in the legislative texts and has therefore been 
left to the courts the elaborate. What is the measure of consent? Is there 
an objective or implied consent in sexual activity? How do you 
demonstrate consent? Clearly, this is an area where traditional legal 
frameworks can intrude upon the law and stifle legislative reform. 
Recently, in Ewanchulr, the Supreme Court clearly articulated its 
position. With respect to the issue of consent, speaking for the majority 
of the court, Major J. held that "for the purposes of determining the 
absence of consent as an element of the actus reus, the actual state of 
mind of the complainant is determinative. At this point, the trier of fact 
is only concerned with the complainant's perspective. The approach is 
purely subjective. " 78 With respect to this issue, the court was 
unanimous. Major J. justified his position by stating: 
The rationale underlying the criminalization of assault explains this. 
Society is committed to protecting the personal integrity, both 
physical and psychological, of every individual. Having control over 
who touches one's body, and how, lies at the core of human dignity 
and autonomy. The inclusion of assault and sexual assault in the Code 
expresses society's determination to protect the security of the person 
from any non-consensual contact or threats of force. 79 
The approach taken by the courts is, in some ways, revolutionary, in that 
it bases itself on a new model of sexual assault - "the communication 
model."80 Interestingly, however, is the way in which this new model is 
77 /bk!. at para. 89. 
78 Ibid. at para 27. 
79 Ibid. at para. 28. 
80 Several authors have emphasized communication as the emerging definitional element 
of assault. See, for instance, Lois Pineau, "Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis" (1989) 8 Law and 
Philosophy 21 7 and Archard, supra note 51. 
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rooted in the traditional legal forms of liberalism, that is the protection 
of physical integrity and autonomy. 
The potential impact of this new model in other areas of the sexual 
assault laws in substantial. The interplay between the consent and the 
fault element is important here: 
The criteria for mens rea, for the reasonableness of belief, and for 
consent are closely related. For although a man's sincere belief in the 
consent of his victim may be sufficient to defeat mens rea, the court is 
less likely to believe his belief is sincere if his belief is not reasonable. 
If his belief is reasonable, they are more likely to believe in the 
sincerity of his belief. But evidence of the reasonableness of his belief 
is also evidence that consent really did take place. For the very things 
that make it reasonable for him to believe that the defendant consented 
are often the very things that that incline the court to believe that she 
consented. What is often missing is the voice of the women herself, an 
account of what it would be reasonable for her to agree to, that is an 
account of what ifreasonable from her standpoint. 81 
This means that reconstituting notions of consent can also impact on the 
content of the mens rea requirement. It can be argued, for instance, that 
in many cases failure to communicate is not simply a negligent act on 
the part of the part of the accused, but that it represents willful blindness 
or recklessness. Such a shift in the content the me!ls rea requirement can 
be said to be reflective of a shift in the cultural norms of sexual 
encounters. If the communication model is legally (and culturally) 
understood as standard practice in sexual encounters, lack of 
communication on the part of the accused can be characterized as 
evidence (although perhaps not conclusive evidence) of a guilty mind. 
Likewise the shift in conceptual paradigms will, to some extent, 
allow the court to bypass the constitutional dilemma with respect to the 
admissibility of sexual history evidence. The question thus shifts from 
an issue of constitutional admissibility to an issue of relevance. If the 
question to be determined at trial is whether consent took place and 
consent is judged by the type and quality of the communication between 
the parties during the sexual encounter, then most of the evidence having 
to do with the victim's past sexual history and lifestyle, particularly with 
other partners, becomes irrelevant. New fo1ms of evidence will have to 
be adduced: 
81 Pineau, ibkl. at 219. 
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On the old model of aggressive seduction we sought evidence of 
resistance. But on the new model of communicative sexuality what we 
want is evidence of on-going positive and encouraging response on the 
part of the plaintiff. This new model will require quite different tactics 
on the part of cross-examiners, and quite different expectations on the 
part of juries and judges. 82 
Clearly, the full impact of the Ewanchuk decision is not yet known. 
What is interesting, however, is the way in which both the courts and the 
legislators have gradually taken up the criticisms posed by both radical 
and liberal feminists and have transfo1med old ideologies of liberalism 
and individualism into new conceptual frameworks. 
It is il!teresti11g to 11011etlteless, wltat a rape law fimlled 
around tlte ideal of sexual integrity a11d embodied auto11omy migltt 
look like. The most obJ11o!ls cltange would be a move awayfi·om the 
emphasis on lack cf consent as the central determincmt ol sexual 
abuse. Ratlter tltese.femim:rt argume17/s would.favour a more complex 
sexual assault law wl?iclt specifies particular conditzons under which 
coercive, violent or degrading sex!lal encou11ters should be 
prohibited This is not to say that the value of sexual would 
dti·ect a ve1y great reliance on cnimi!Cllisa/1011 as a mode qfprotectti1g 
tlte imagti1ary. On the contrmy, crimti!Cllisation is likely to be all 
elJectiJJe dr!fe11der qfthe tinaginmy domain at the symbolic rather titan 
the 1i1strume11tal level. F!lrthennore, thollgh lawyers are inclined to 
lose sight qf the obvious.fact, the most important comlil1ons.for sexual 
equality and ti1tegrity lie 1i1 c!!ll!!rcll at!Iludes rather than coercive 
legal rules.s.1 
In January 1999, as an on-going effort at redrafting its Penal Code, 
Finland introduced major revisions to its sexual offences laws. Chapter 
20, which is now entitled 'Of Offences against Sexual Self-
detennination', covers offences relating to: rape and other fonns of 
sexual coercion; sexual exploitation of children, the disabled and other 
82 Ibid at 240. 
83 Supra note 3 5 at I 0. 
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vulnerable persons; as well as, sexual procurement or 'pimping' .84 
Because of the novelty of these enactments, the practical effects of these 
changes are still unknown. What will be examined in this paper, 
however, are the legal and social forces that influenced the direction of 
the cmTent legislation. One interesting aspect of the Finnish reforms is 
that they are somewhat out of keeping with the country's larger penal 
reform movement, which emphasizes decriminalization. In the area of 
sexual offences, the scope of the law has actually increased. These 
legislative changes have been infonned by a growing awareness by 
Finnish scholars of feminist or 'women's law' issues. 
Prior to the legislative reforms enacted in 1999, there were two 
categories of crimes that could properly fall within the current scope of 
the Canadian sexual assault provisions. 'Forcible rape', which was 
punishable with up to I 0 years imprisonment, occurred when a women 
was forced to have sexual intercourse 'by violence or by threat of an 
imminent danger.' 'Sexual assault', which was punishable by fine or for 
up to 4 years, occurred when a women was forced to have sexual 
intercourse or some other indecency 'by violence or by threat. ' 85 
It should be noted that in neither set of provisions was 'lack of 
consent' a definitional element of the offence, nor, although formally 
available to the accused as a justification, was it an arguable issue at 
trial, despite regular pronouncements by the defendant that "she wanted 
to". 86 Jaatinen argues that the penal code provisions are comprehensive 
in their form and any that any discussion with respect to defenses, such 
as consent or duress, are merely academic exercises. 87 The crime of rape 
or sexual assault, however, is understood to be a crime against the self-
detennination of the victim. Therefore, lack of consent is an implicit 
element of the offence. In addition, in the context of the presentation of 
s-1 (Uno!Jlcio/) Feno/ Code of Finland (Ministry of Justice, Law Drafting Depmiment) 
[unpublished]. 
Edward Wise, ed., The Fel!ol Code ofFinlolld Olld Related Lows, trans. Matti Joutsen, 
(Colorado: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1987). 
86 Telephone interview with M. Steinburg by D. Cashman (1March1999). Meri Steinburg 
is an advocate with Unioni, the Finnish League of Women. 
87 Telephone Interview with H. Jaatinen by D. Cashman (23 February 1999). Heikki 
Jaatinen is a Professor of Criminal Law at Turku University 
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evidence, many things at a practical level hinge on whether or not there 
has been consent. 88 But these issues are rarely articulated using the 
language of consent. Instead, the court focuses on the physical evidence, 
as well as the conduct of the parties, in order to determine culpability. 
The pivotal issue has typically not been consent, "but the nature of the 
threat."89 In Finland, 'taking advantage of someone who is unable to 
defend himself/herself or to make or express a decision' falls under a 
separate crime of 'sexual abuse,' 90 and this seems to care of those 
circumstances where the victim's consent would said to be vitiated 
under Canadian law (far example, in instances of intoxication). 91 The 
issue of consent as justification or excuse is generally restricted to 
"hockey, boxing, karate, and other contact sports where injuries 
sometimes occur."92 Koivula states: 
About 400 rapes/year are reported to police and studies indicate that 
the real figure could be as much as 1500. Among these 400 there are 
possibly 5-10 cases where consent is even mentioned let alone taking 
into consideration. These are usually cases where rape has not 
occurred and the woman is after vengeance or money. Consent is 
pretty hard to prove by the accused in a rape trial so it is a very rarely 
tried by the defense.93 
Nousiainen argues that because consent is not a definitional aspect of the 
offense in Finland, it makes it difficult to raise the issue as a defense. She 
states: 
I would say that [the fact that consent is not a definitional element] has 
made it more difficult to point out the relevance of the discussion and 
also to develop a rape specific discussion on the thing .. .I could say 
that somehow it seems that we haven't been having a very good 
discussion about the problems involved in these specific types of cases 
compared to what is consent in some other contexts. It is a very 
different thing if you are talking about consent to rough sport and so 
on.94 
88 Telephone interview with K. Nousiainen (7 March 2000). Kevat Nousianen is a 
Professor of Legal Theory at the University of Helsinki. 
89 Telephone Interview with K. Nousiainen by D. Cashman (3 March 1999). 
90 Supra note 84. 
91 Telephone Interview with K. Nousiainen by D. Cashman (5 April 1999). 
92 E-mail correspondence ofT. Koivula to D. Cashman (6 March 1999). Tuomas Koivula 
is a Finnish law student. 
93 ibid 
94 Supra note 88. 
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The substantive highlights of the 1999 changes can be summarized 
as follows. There are now four categories of offences that would attract 
the Canadian sexual assault provisions. 'Rape', punishable for 1-6 
years, is defined as forcing sexual intercourse by violence or threat of 
violence. Included under this provision is causing an unconscious state 
of mind and taking advantage of that state. 'Aggravated rape', 
punishable for 2-10 years, occurs where there is rape and: a) there is 
intent to cause bodily injmy, disease, or to endanger the victim's life; b) 
many persons participated in the rape or the rape resulted in extreme 
mental of physical suffering; c) the act was committed in a particularly 
humiliating, harsh, or cruel manner; d) guns, knives or other deadly 
weapon was used; or e) there were other circumstances considered to be 
particularly harsh or brutal. 'Coerced sexual intercourse', punishable by 
no more than 3 years, occurs where the violence or threat was marginal, 
there were mitigating circumstances, or the threat used was not one of 
violence. 'Coerced sexual activity', punishable by a fine or no more than 
3 years in prison, occurs when sexual activities other than rape are 
forced by violence or threat and the result is a violation of one's right to 
sexual self-determination. The definition of intercourse has been 
expanded to include non-vaginal penetration. Also, the language is now 
gender neutral in its application. Prosecution with respect to the first two 
offences is no longer at the discretion of the victim. It is also worth 
noting that since 1994, marriage is no longer a defense to the crime of 
rape. 
When comparing the Finnish and Canadian legislation, several 
differences emerge. As already noted, lack of consent is not a 
definitional element of any of the sexual assault offenses under Finnish 
legislation. Historically, 'use of force' was the essential and defining 
feature of rape. Recognition of the inadequacy of such a narrow 
definition of rape, however, helped to spur the recent legislative 
refonns. The goal of the recent amendments was to broaden the scope of 
the law, by criminalizing sexual acts in circumstances of sexual 
coercion. Unlike the Canadian sexual assault provisions, which are 
broadly drafted to include any non-consensual sexual act, the Finnish 
law clearly sets out prohibited conditions and circumstances in the actus 
reus of the offense. With respect to the crime of aggravated assault, 
some attention is also paid to the injuries sustained by the victim as a 
result from the offence. Also, the Finnish legislation clearly 
distinguishes between criminal acts, which include penetration (of any 
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"sexual organ"), and other sexual crimes. It is also worth noting the 
lower maximum penalties for sexual crimes under the Finnish 
legislation. 
word needs to be said about the admissibility of evidence in 
Finland. Finland, like other civil law jurisdictions, has a general rule of 
'free evaluation of evidence.' This means that very little is excluded. 
There is, however, no jury in Finland- cases are generally heard in front 
of one professional judge, who directs the process, sitting with two lay 
judges. Evidence of the complainant's general lifestyle and sexual 
history is rarely adduced by the defense; it is generally not seen as 
relevant. 95 In 1998, new criminal law procedures were introduced which 
severely restricted the length of the trial process. This has also led to a 
decrease in the use of sexual-history evidence by the defendant. 96 This 
means that the problem of rape myths, as they have been described in 
Canada, has not been an issue in Finland. What the comi does tend to be 
evaluate, however, is the level of responsibility that the pariies should 
assume.97 How the pariies behaved, or should of behaved, becomes 
relevant in this context.98 
Physical evidence is the primary mode of proof for the 
prosecution.99 In Helsinki, a specialized unit within the hospital has 
been established to examine rape victims after a crime has been 
reported. 100 Secondary sources of evidence include psychiatric evidence 
of 'rape trauma syndrome', testimony from the victim's relatives and 
friends with whom she may have confided after the rape, and the 
victim's own testimony. 101 It is rare, however, except in cases where the 
victim and the perpetrator are strangers (and the women's story is 
presumed to be true), or the women's story is pariicularly compelling, 
that the defendant will be convicted without physical evidence 
supporting the victim's claim. Indirectly, then, the comi does consider 
the issue of consent, although it is never ariiculated as such. 
95 Nousianen, supra note 88. 
96 Steinburg, supra note 86. 
97 Jaatinen, supra note 87. 
98 Nousianen, supra note 91. 
99 Steinburg, supra, note 86. 
100 Ibid. 
IOI Ibid. 
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It can be said that the new provisions, insofar as they relate to the 
crimes of rape and the newly constituted crime of sexual coercion, do 
not so much represent a change in philosophical direction of the core 
content of the law, but, rather, represent a moderate expansion of 
judicial authority. The new title to the Chapter, 'Of Offences Against 
Sexual Self-Determination', for instance, although technkal{J:replacing 
'Of Offences Against Morality' is simply a formal acknowledgment of 
what has been clearly recognized by the courts and aiiiculated by the 
Government Committees and the Law Reform agencies since the 
1960s 102 that the trne violation resulting from the crime of rape is a 
violation of the personal integrity of the individual women. 103 Whereas 
in Canada, the legislative reforms have represented an ideological shift, 
in Finland the reasons for the legislative amendments have been 
articulated variously as 'to make it easier to prosecute rape', 'to bring 
more cases to court', and 'to differentiate between crimes, providing 
lighter sentencing in some cases, in order to convict more defendants.' 
From a Finnish feminist perspective, the legal issues posed by the 
criminalization of rape are significantly different than those posed by 
Canadian feminists. In Canada, the major source of contestation 
involves the definition of sexual assault and evidentiaiy issues are thus 
engendered by concerns over these basic definitional questions. In other 
words, questions about the relevance and admissibility of evidence 
almost invariably concerns the way in which certain fonns of evidence 
overdetem1ine how rape is ultimately defined, both in- and outside the 
comiroom. In Finland, on the other hand, the problem of rape becomes a 
problem of proof: "we see the problem ve1y much as a question of 
evidence ... and there has been discussion of the problems that arise when 
too much emphasis is put on the discussion of the violent character or 
how the violence aspect is to be treated ... but the problems of evidence 
are ve1y much in the foreground." 104 Thus, the changes that occurred 
with respect to the definition of rape have had more to do with functional 
purposes (that is, increasing the rates of criminal prosecution), than with 
changing the core content of the law. While in some camps there were 
102 Nousianen. supra note 89. 
103 According to Nousiainen, the "de-dramatization", and I take her to mean the gradual 
shift away from rape as a erime of shame and morality, has been oeeurring in the eourts for the 
last 30 years. 
104 Nousianen, supra note 91. 
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concerns about the symbolism attached to reducing the sentences for 
acts of sexual aggression, it seems to be widely accepted that the new 
laws, insofar as they increase prosecuting powers, are beneficial. 
Nousiainen believes that one important issue that has not yet been 
addressed in Finland and which may eventually become a part of the 
legal debate has to do with the issue of the fault requirement and whose 
interpretation of events is being considered in the evaluation of evidence 
having to do with fault. Currently, intent is required to get a conviction. 
She argues, however, that recklessness or negligence may be a better 
measure of fault. This issue is presently being debated in other 
Scandinavian countries. 
2. Purposes of the Criminal Law in Finland 
In order to understand the contextual differences between Canada 
and Finland with respect to the way in which the crime of rape is 
understood, both through law and general legal discourse, it is necessary 
to say a word about the role of the criminal law in the context of a 
Scandinavian welfare state. Nousiainen believes, for instance, that the 
Finnish approach with respect to the purposes of the criminal law have 
"influenced feminist criminologists so that it hasn't been possible ... to 
demand for increased or harsher punishments, so that, I think, we have 
been in a kind of tight position in that on one hand, saying women have 
not been treated right or equally, or the female victims are not treated 
well and, on the other hand, trying to say this in terms that are acceptable 
in the welfare state type of criminal law discussion." 105 
Since the 1970s, there has been a shift in the general penal 
philosophy of Finland. As in other Scandinavian countries, Finland is 
moving away from using the criminal law as an instrument for the 
treatment or punishment of the offender. This is probably truer for 
Finland, "which emphasizes shorter sentences and fewer 
convictions,'' 106 than for any other country. Finland is very proud of the 
fact, for instance, that it has been the only Western jurisdiction to have 
actually reduced its prison population in the last number of years. 
Anttila and Tornudd attribute this to the fact that: 
ios Ibid. 
106 Ibid. 
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treatment ideology never had time to establish itself as the main 
refonn ideology, It was weak during the 1940s and 1950s and when 
the old guard relinquished its grip on power in the 1960s, the new 
reformers had already adopted a critical stance towards both the 
practice of coercive treatment and its background ideology, the 
medical model of crime. 107 
In a sense, Finland thus leaped-over the treatment stage in the 
historical development of penal reform ideologies and went directly 
towards a modem ideology, emphasizing both rationality in the form 
of a general prevention and classic principles of justice ... The special 
circumstances [of Finland], however, ensured that the justice 
orientation is only a distant relation to, for example, the neoclassical 
school of American origin. 108 
Nousiainen argues that, in Finland, the use of criminalization as an 
instrument of social control is restricted to "classical criminal law, with 
a lot of demands placed on legality." This is because there is "an 
understanding that the criminal law is something very bad in itself," and 
should be seen as the "the last possible way of doing something to any 
social problem." 109 Anttila and Tornudd state: 
The evils of indeterminate incarceration under harsh discipline in 
closed institutions operated by the social authorities enraged 
intellectuals and human rights activists. Earlier claims for the 
effectiveness of treatment (and punishment) became suspect in the 
light of increased methodological sophistication and new research 
findings. It is fair to say that the new generation of reformers which 
entered the scene in the 1960s saw the ideology of coercive treatment 
as one of their main foes. 110 
The unique Scandinavian approach to the criminal law is consistent 
with the general ideology of the welfare state and the creation of the 
"public family." 111 The goals behind the welfare state can be 
summarized in terms of the principles social justice. It is believed that 
107 Inkeri Antilla & Patrik Tornudd, "The Dynamics of Finnish Criminal Code Reform" in 
Raimo Lahti & Kimmo Nuotio, eds., Cnini11al Law ti1 Tra11silion:Ftimish and Comparative 
Perspectives (Helsinki: Finnish Lawyers Publishing,1992) 11 at 12. 
108 /bid. at 13. 
109 Supra note 91. 
110 SzljJra note I 07 at 13. 
111 Alan Wolfe, Whose Keeper: Social Science a11cl A1oral Obligalio11 (Berkley: University 
of California Pres, 1989). 
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"[b ]y removing families from the vagaries of the market, by protecting 
workers against arbitrary firings, by contributing to economic growth, 
by creating equality in society as a whole and thereby reducing stress" 112 
a type of social harmony can be achieved. Such harmony would reduce 
social tensions, which are the general sources of criminal behaviour, and 
would thereby reduce the need for the intervention of criminal law. 
Thus, there is a social obligation to decrease criminality at its source. 
For Finnish law reformers, who are schooled in sociology, the criminal 
law "is not the proper vehicle for directing social change"113 because the 
"level of criminality in a society is primarily determined by factors other 
than the threat of punishment." 114 For Finns, the social and economic 
costs of using the criminal law as a mechanism of social change 
generally outweigh its potential benefits. 
Although there is a tendency towards abolitionism, 115 most Finns 
believe that the criminal justice system has an important purpose, but 
that it should be used sparingly. The purpose of the criminal law tends to 
be symbolic, rather than practical, a social denunciation of activities so 
morally repugnant, or socially damaging, that they deserve criminal 
sanction. Anttila and Tomudd argues that: 
to the extent that the criminal justice system does have an impact on 
crime this effect is achieJJed through general prevelltioll mechanisms 
(using this term i11 its exte11sive sense) rather than through 
mechanisms of e.g. deterrence or indiJJic!ua! preve11tion. The criminal 
justice system should meet high standards of justice but the aim of the 
system is not to do justice but to control human behaviour. While other 
agencies of social control may be important, no society can manage 
without a criminal justice system [emphasis added]. 116 
The importance of the criminal system, then, relates to the "indirect" or 
"symbolic" effects of criminalization. Under this model, using 
individual offenders to promote social goals is morally unjustifiable. 
Criminal punishment, in terms of the time spent in prison, should 
therefore be limited. 
112 Ibid at 134. 
113 Supra note 107 at 13. 
""Ibid. 
115 See, for instance, Ezzat A. Fatteh, "Beyond Metaphysics" in Raimo Lahti & Kimmo 
Nuotio, eds., Criminal Law in Transi!io11.Fi1111ish and Comparative PerspecliJJes (Helsinki: 
Finnish Lawyers Publishing, 1992) who sees the criminal justice system as an anachronism 
of Christian morality and serves no purpose in contemporary society. 
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Finland's approach to the criminal law cannot be divorced from its 
legal culture generally. It is significant, for instance, that Finland has a 
very strong tradition of formal legalism and strict interpretation. 
Pylkk:iinen117 argues that historically Finland's strict approach to legal 
interpretation was used to protect the country against the onslaught of 
Russian imperialism. But whatever its historical roots, the country's 
approach to legal interpretation, together with its distinctive 
understanding of the proper purposes of the criminal law, has meant that 
the evolution of sexual assault laws in Finland has been historically 
distinct from that in Canada. In Finland, for instance, the recent 
legislative reforms have tended to focus on drafting changes that would 
have the effect of increasing the scope of the law in this area. It is 
interesting to note that despite the general move towards de-
criminalization in Finland, the scope of the criminal law in the area of 
sexual offences has actually increased. This anomaly is, as will be 
shown, in large part due, to new social circumstances that have given 
rise to increased reflection on notions of sexuality, and the state's role in 
regulating sexual relationships. More importantly, however, is the 
emerging phenomenon of 'women's law' in Scandinavian academic 
circles, and the way in which this movement has created a social space in 
which women can address issues that are unique to the particular 
circumstances of 'womanhood.' 
3. Sexuality and Gender in Finland 
It is a popular stereotype that Scandinavian countries are sexually 
promiscuous. This is largely inaccurate, however. 118 Finland, in 
particular, has traditionally had a strong sexual ethic, grounded in the 
country's agrarian roots. It can be argued that low levels of urbanization 
are a key factor in the maintenance of traditional values. Even today, 
Finnish urbanization has not occurred in a scale or in a manner seen in 
116 Supra note 107. 
117 Amt Pylkkanen, "Women's Law and Cultural Understandings of Gender in Finland" in 
Clare McGlynn, ed. Legal Femit11sms.-Tl!e01:y one/ Practice (Rants: Dartmouth Publishing, 
1998). 
118 There seems to be some anecdotal evidence that Scandinavian countries are becoming 
more promiscuous in recent years, but this tends to be the general trend in North America, as 
well. And rather than such promiscuity being inherently Scandinavian, it may be a product of 
the globalization of American culture. 
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most industrialized societies. It would be fair to say that the Finnish 
sexual ethic is quite different than the one found in Canada. It is based 
on the traditional values of the countryside, rather than on Christian 
morality. Christianity never established a firm hold on the Finnish 
society. Not only did Christianity come late to Finland, but, during the 
early period of welfare reform, the church was co-opted by the state. 
Goran Gustafsson argues that the integration of the church into the state 
apparatus occurred in order to secure the state's influence over the 
institution, thereby effectively eliminating any competing ideologies. 119 
Therefore, at an informal level at least, Finland is perhaps more 
secularized than either Canada or the United States. 120 
In Finland, sexual morality is not so much marked by strict rules of 
conduct, culminating in prohibition, but rather by an ethic of 
responsibility. Historically, marriage was not seen as a prerequisite for 
sex, but sex was viewed as a precursor to marriage. It was common 
practice for couples to formalize their union only after the birth of their 
first child. 121 This does not mean that the society prescribed to an ethic 
of promiscuity with free and casual sex. On the contrary, sex was only to 
be undertaken in the context of an intimate and long-term relationship. 
Honkatukia contends that the North American dating culture does not 
exist in Finland. 122 This means that sexual encounters between men and 
women do not have the same history of social regulation as they do in 
Canada. In Finland, for instance, it is commonplace for a couple to be 
introduced at a bar and then to go home together for coffee and 
conversation, without expectation by either party that sex will take 
place. 123 Sex, however, is seen as an integral part of the dating 
119 Goran Gustaffson, "Politicization of State Churches: A Welfare State Model," (1990) 
37:1 Social Compass 107. 
120 Lutherism is, however, the state supported church and people pay dues to the church 
through the tax system. Recently it has become easier to 'divorce the church' but most don't 
bother, particularly since, as long as they remain due paying members, they are entitled to 
receive benefits from the church, including free burials, weddings, and communions. 
121 David Bradley, Family Law and Political Culture: Scandti10vkm Laws tit Comparative 
Perspective (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1996). 
122 Telephone interview with P. Honkatukia (9 March 2000). Paivi Honkatukia is an 
Officer at the National Research Institute of Legal Policy. 
123 E-mail correspondence from P. Honkatukia to D Cashman on March 9,2000. 
Honkatukia collaborated with colleague Heini Kainulainen in drafting this letter. 
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relationship from very early on and it is anticipated that women will 
have several sexual relationships before marriage. 124 
The absence of a restrictive code of sexual conduct means that the 
'double standard,' a defining feature of traditional North American 
sexual culture, has not been an issue in Finland. Empirical research has 
found, for instance, that, at least historically, there was a greater 
acceptance of the non-virginity of one's sexual partner in Scandinavian 
than in North American society. 125 The institution of the sauna in 
Finland also serves to counter sexual modesty and improve a spirit of 
openness. It can be argued that Scandinavian sexuality was never 
repressed nor viewed as a dangerous social contagion that it has in 
traditional Christian societies. Instead of a double standard, sexuality in 
Scandinavian countries is marked by a single standard and supported by 
an ethic of responsibility. Moreover, these values are consistent with the 
principles of equality and social justice found in the modem welfare 
state. 
It can, perhaps, be argued that where issues of sexuality were 
largely repressed in North American culture, they were normalized, and 
thus made invisible, in Scandinavian society. Recently, however, with 
the break-up of the Soviet Union, rings of organized prostitution, run by 
the Russian mafia, have made their way into Finland and have spurred 
debate about what it means to be sexually determining. 126 In many ways, 
the introduction of prostitution into Finnish culture makes sexual 
vulnerability a visible issue. Moreover, Nousiainen argues that this 
increase in visible prostitution has impacted on the male-female 
dynamic. She states: 
it has become much more difficult for women to uphold sexual self-
determination as it has become much more common, for example, that 
you are bothered in the street, and you also may be bothered also in the 
restaurants if you are sitting alone, or with other women, you are very 
often addressed in a way that really didn't occur in the eighties. And 
124 /bid. 
125 Harold Christensen and Christina Gregg, "Changing Sex Norms in America and 
Scandinavia" in Robert Bell & Michael Gorden, eds., Tlte Social Dime11sioll o/ Human 
Sexuality (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1972) 4 7. 
126 It has largely been held that until recently, prostitution did not exist in Finland. It has 
emerged in the context of increasing freedom of movement by Russian and Estonian nationals, 
and, to some extent, by rising unemployment in Finland, which has made women particularly 
vulnerable. 
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there has been quite a lot of talk, for example, about the way children 
seem to behave in the schools. It is very typical today that boys, for 
example, call girls whores, which, as far as we know, wasn't very 
typical ten years ago, let's say. That way of talking about girls seems to 
have become really very common. Of course, it is difficult to say what 
are the reasons, and what are the causes, and what are the results, but 
there has been a change. 127 
Thus, whereas in the past issues of sexuality were largely invisible and 
noncontroversial in Finland, they have recently become the centre of 
social debate. Coincidently, the rise of prostitution in Finland has 
coincided with the Scandinavian women's law movement, which is an 
attempt to bring a women-centered perspective to political and legal 
discourse. 
4. Feminism in Emergence of Women's Law 
Julkunen argues that "the concept of individual rights has never 
been as important in Nordic countries as in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Constitutional rights are not invoked here, as in the United States."128 
Although the concept of individual rights and libe1iies is accepted as 
noncontroversial in the Scandinavian context, the emphasis has tended 
to be on the protection of "social rights guaranteed minimum income, 
employment, education and health- [those things which] make citizens 
free and equal."129 This has meant that "[e]quality between classes has 
been the principle and guiding rational for the Nordic welfare state"130 
and traditionally women have had to invoke this conceptual framework 
in order to pursue their interests and views. 
Because of its emphasis on equality, and what this has meant in 
terms of women's basic social needs, Finland is often cited by 
international agencies as being the best place in the world for women to 
live. Julkunen argues that women's equality with men is the result of 
Finland's unique history, which laid the groundwork for "structures and 
mentalities conducive to equality between the sexes." She argues that 
historically: 
127 Supra note 91. 
128 Raija Julkunen, "Women's Rights in Finland" in Fti111ish PerspectiJJes (Finnish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996) 3 at 3. 
129 Ibid. at 4. 
130 Ibid. at 4. 
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[w]omen's labour was indispensable in agrarian communities and the 
low salaries of male workers in combination with only rudimentary 
health and social security forced wives to work outside the home. The 
absence of the traditional male breadwinning role prevented the 
development of a strong patriarchal culture with its associated 
institutions. 131 
Scandinavian countries, in general, are characterized as the 'weak male 
breadwinner' or 'dual breadwinner' societies. As a result, in 
Scandinavia, gender categories are generally more fluid than they are in 
North America: 
The space within which we as gendered beings can manuoeuvre is 
fairly wide in our (Scandinavian) culture ... Here a personal mixture of 
gender symbols in conduct and attitudes is acceptable, on condition 
that certain prescribed limits are observed or certain ceremonial rituals 
are performed. 132 
It needs to be clarified that, at least in Finland, the political focus 
has traditionally "centred on equalizing differences between social 
classes, regions and the sexes. At the same time, however, minority 
rights and human rights have not been well protected." 133 This is 
impmiant to understand because the paradox of the Finnish emphasis on 
equality is that, in many ways, it tends to subve1i considerations of 
difference. Pylkkanen states: "[e]quality policies have concentrated on 
administrative measures against discrimination mostly in working life, 
and in allocating some resources to women's studies, but is 
characteristic of Finland that a public discourse of gender equality - or 
rather gender differences - has nevertheless been extremely limited." 134 
In homogeneous Finland, any fo1m of difference, unless based in class 
inequality, is viewed with suspicion. Moreover, the politics of 
consensus and social ham1ony, which are the dominant features of the 
Finnish social and political structures, has further marginalized 
discourses of difference. Korvajarvi argues, for instance, that the 
subversion of difference between the sexes determines the character of 
the Finnish workplace: 
131 Ibid at 5. 
132 Lis H0jgaard, "Working Fathers Caught in the Web of the Symbolic Order of Gender" 
( 1990) 4(3) Acta Sociologica 245 at 248. 
133 Julkunen, supra note 128 at 6. 
134 Supra, note 117. 
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There is little Finnish precedent when it comes to major public 
conflicts between women and men ... As a general rule ... women and 
men strive to avoid gender-based conflicts, preferring instead to work 
for mutual hannony. This also contributed to an image of successfully 
achieved equality between women and men in working life. It is 
further promoted the notion that sexuality and gender do not belong in 
working life ... 
Those who still dare to oppose gender equality are few and far 
between. At the same time, gender equality and the related aspects of 
gender neutrality have led to the avoidance of official conflicts 
between women and men ... Harmony nonetheless has a way of hiding 
actual gendering practices in working life. It is difficult for both 
women and men to conceive of forms of gendering in working life 
because they can even elude verbalization. Events and processes speak 
for themselves here. It is culturally problematic for women to view 
themselves as "women", above all else. Instead they prefer to identify 
themselves as "workers" or "human beings." 135 
This principle of gender neutrality has also impacted legal 
discourses in a broad range of areas. Julkunen argues, for instance, that 
"Finland's permissive Abortion Act was not justified in terms of 
women's rights but in terms of public health and of equality between 
social classes and regions."136 In other words, it was argued that poorer 
women, living in remote districts, "should not be forced to give bi1ih to 
unwanted children or to undergo illegal abortions that have adverse 
effects on health." 137 Julkunen goes on to state that: 
discussions of sexual harassment, rape, wife abuse and the sexual 
coercion of wives have continued to suffer the fate of suppressed, 
almost taboo subjects in Finland. These family violence phenomena 
cannot be seen as cases of class or regional inequality as can abmiion. 
Family violence occurs in all social categories, which makes it 
essentially an issue centred on the relationship between the sexes. 138 
The slow emergence of 'women's law' 139 during the last decade 
can best be described by the oft quoted passage of Tove Dahl who says 
135 Piiivi Korvajiirvu, "Gendering Practices in Working Life" in Finnish Perspectiws 
(Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996) 11at14-15. 
136 Stijlra note 128 at 7. 
137 Ibid. at 7 
138 Ibid. at 7. 
139 For general discussions about the idea of women's law see: Tove Stang Dahl, Womens 
Law: A Introduction to Femims! Jurispmdence, Ronald Craig, trans. (Oslo: Norwegian 
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that the purpose of women's law is "to describe, analyze, explain and 
understand the legal status of women in order to improve their status in 
law and in society in general." 140 Women's law involves moving 
beyond doctrines of gender neutrality in order to meet the needs of a 
gender-specific reality. In particular, women's law has been interested 
in the way in which the instruments of the welfare state can be used to 
improve women's lives. Importantly, women's law is not simply a legal 
discourse. Rather it is has been systematically incorporated into a 
broader philosophical frameworks and has become a part of a larger 
feminist strategy. Pylkkanen argues, however, that the women's 
movement poses special challenges for the science of law, which has 
been dominated by a legal culture that is "young, positivist, and 
male." 141 
It is within the analytic framework of women's law that the issue of 
violence against women is currently being debated. Dahl states: 
"protection against violations of integrity has been in the centre of 
woman's politics the last few years, and women studies have 
contributed by revealing the nature and extent of these violations, 
analyzing their effects, and suggesting refonns." 142 Nousiainen states 
that today "questions of violence against women occupy our time 
here." 143 Women's law has thus created a discursive space within which 
the issue of rape can be released from the proverbial closet. Feminist 
have recently begun to address, for instance, the issue of why "few 
[rape] cases are prosecuted", despite high rates of attacks. 144 This has 
meant changes to the definitional aspects of rape, in order to overcome 
evidentiary obstacles. The new legislative scheme has therefore 
attempted to clearly articulate the conditions under which rape is said to 
occur, thereby extending the arm of the law to a broader range of 
prohibited acts. In addition, at least in regard to the more serious 
University Press, 1988); Hane Petersen "On Women and Legal Concepts: Infonnal Law 
and the Nonn of Consideration," (1992) I Social and Legal Studies 493; Agnette Weis 
Bentzon, "Comments on Women's Law in Scandinavia," (1986) 14 International Journal of 
the Sociology of Law 249; Tove Stang Dahl "Taking Women as a Staiiing Point: Building on 
Women's Law" (1986) 14 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 239. 
140 Dahl ( 1988) ibid. 
141 Supra note 117 at 152. 
142 Sl07ra note 139 at 101. 
143 Supra note 89. 
144 ibid. 
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offenses, the decision to prosecute is no longer at the discretion of the 
victim for fear that she may be "intimidated" or "paid off'. 145 This does 
not mean, however, that the criminal law is seen as a panacea. Feminists 
continue to be deeply influenced by the Scandinavian penal philosophy, 
which restricts the use of the criminal law: 
In the last few years the question of what criminal law responses could 
most effectively deter sexual offences has aroused considerable 
debate. Researchers in woman's law have in this context relied upon 
the general conviction in criminology and criminal law that increased 
punishment seldom lead to a change of conduct in an area like this -
and that a change in conduct must despite everything be the main 
objective. For rape victims the legal system will seldom involve 
res ti tu ti on. 146 
As an alternative to the singular focus on criminal conviction, women's 
groups, as well as Finland's Department of Health, both contribute 
resources to providing therapy to women victimized by violence. 147 In 
addition, women's groups devote some of their budgeted resources to 
obtaining higher compensation and damage awards for victims of rape 
related offenses. 148 
One interesting aspect of the women's law movement in Finland is 
that, as a source of social critique, it has largely emerged from within 
state institutions. Pylkkanen states that "the pursuit of equality ... has 
been very much connected with the state, at the same time that it has 
been an academic discipline. Since the 1960s era of state feminism, a 
women's movement separate from the state has been almost non-
existent."149 Pylkkanen argues that the movement's inextricable link to 
the state has weakened the scope of its critique because it provides no 
external opposition to existing legal institutions. The context of 
legislative reform in Finland has thus been very different that that which 
has occmTed in Canada where feminists have actively engaged in 
debates about the legitimacy of the legal foundations upon which the 
sexual assault laws have been built. 150 Pylkkanen states: 
145 Steinburg, supra note 86. 
146 Dahl ( 1988), supra note 139 at 103. 
147 Nousianen, supra note 88. Most of these resources tend to do to victims of domestic 
violence, but increasing rape victims also have access to these resources. 
14s Ibid. 
149 Supra note I 09. 
150 Honkatukia and Kainulainen, supra note 123, argue that "in Finland there has been 
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In the Finnish tradition, there is a strong tendency to negotiate and be 
constructive instead of being radical. Instead of strong individualism, 
communitarian values still dominate. I would say that a negotiation of 
meanings is going on all the time, not struggle. Feminist research and 
theory cannot develop without specific institutional forms, but unlike 
many others, Finns always want to integrate and avoid overt 
controversy. 151 
Pylkkiinen argues that "[a ]lthough practitioners of women's law do also 
engage in official equality policies and administration, it is even more 
important !for them/ to develop a specific critical approach to legal 
science and the legal system itself as a whole' [emphasis added]. 152 
Pylkkiinen states: 
With its theoretical emphasis, Finnish feminism within law is less 
pragmatic and in a sense less radical than in many other countries. But 
I would like to stress that maybe this approach is even more radical 
with its aims at redefining many aspects of the mainstream legal 
science itself. We do not want to accept descriptions of 'gender' or 
'equality' as defined in current cultural and legal codes but try instead 
to find ways to redefine them to get distance from dichotomous 
heterosexist thinking of gender as well as rationalities in the liberal 
thinking of justice. 153 
Thus, in Finland, the issue is not changing heterosexual norms as they 
are understood within North American culture. Honkatukia argues that 
this is because the paradigm of gender neutrality has served Finnish 
women well and, as a result, issues that could potentially harm gender 
hannony have been avoided. 154 The process of legislative refonn has 
therefore been less radical in Finland than in Canada. The issues raised 
by woman's law include: 'what are the paiiicular needs of women as a 
group?' 'how are men and women differently effected by their social 
interactions?,' and 'in what ways can the law be used to deal with the 
particular circumstances in which women find themselves?' One area 
that was not addressed by the recent reforms, which primarily focused 
hardly any discussion around rape, and it has been only in the 1990's that violence against 
women in general has been recognized as a social problem in public discussions ... Recently, 
'pminer violence' has raised a lot of attention, but the issue of rape has not been talked about." 
151 S11pm 117 at 161. 
152 ibid. at 159. 
153 ibid. at 161. 
154 S11pm note 123. 
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on evidentiary rather than definitional problems, concerns the issue of 
fault and whose understanding of the events is emphasized when 
evaluating evidence pertaining to fault. Although this issue has not yet 
reached a level of debate of any significance in Finland, it is an issue that 
is appropriate to the content of the women's law movement. 
IV. RAPE IN p AKISTAN: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Islamist women I spoke to saw rape as a symptom qf the lack qf 
religious values in the society. It was mgued that rape was tinported 
into cultural value systems along with other cultural li1stitutions it is 
alien to the Islamic culture ... According to some Islamist women, the 
only way to eradicate rape was to re-educate 1J1e11, women and 
children about Islam a!ld thus re-instate Islamic values and morality. 
Any other 1J1ea11s, especially the existing penal code, are sztpe1jlcial 
and i/1(!/fective. 155 
Since partition in 1947, Pakistan has struggled to create an identity 
for itself. In a 1999 report for CBC's Ideas, reporter Liza Hebert stated: 
"Pakistan was established as a country for Muslims and has evolved 
further into a Muslim country. Critics say Pakistan is moving very close 
to a theocratic state." 156 In order to understand the origins of the 
Pakistani rape laws, it is necessaiy to have an understanding of the role 
that such laws play under Islam. Tohidi states: 
Some Western-oriented feminists may find it difficult to accept the 
fact that in many 'Third World' countries ... women-and many men as 
well-value the interests of their families more than their own self-
interests ... Many women in developing countries, however, although 
wanting to ensure that their rights are respected and acknowledged, 
cannot afford or are unwilling to assert women's rights in a way that 
'estranges them not just from their family but also from the larger 
community.' 157 
Because of the symbolic role that women have been given in Islam, the 
struggle over Islamization is, at one level, a gender struggle. Few would 
155 Azza Karam FVome11, Islam isms and the State: Contemporary Feminisms in Egypt (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1998). 
156 Liza Hebert, "From Purdah to Politics: Conflict over the Islamic Path" on Ideas (CBC 
Radio: 13 April 1999). 
157 Herbert Bodman and Nayereh Tohidi, eds., Women f!1 Muslim Societies: Diversify 
withi11 Unify (Boulder: Lynne Reiner, 1998) at 282. 
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disagree with the statement that the current rape laws do injustice to 
women. In fact, one Islamic fundamentalist, when asked by interviewer 
Liza Hebe1i whether the current rape laws in Pakistan were working, 
admitted they were not- but went on to argue that the problem was not 
the laws themselves, but the fact that the sharia has not yet been fully 
integrated into Pakistani culture and legal institutions. 158 Given the 
current political climate in Pakistan, the success at any attempt at legal 
reform will almost invariably depend upon whether such reforms have 
foundations in Islamic law. In Pakistan, religion, politics, and law are 
inseparable. 
1. Islam: A religion of the Law 
Joseph Schacht, in a paper exploring the historical relationship 
between theology and law in Islam, begins by stating that "[i]t is a 
truism to say ... that Islam is a religion of the Law" 159 and later argues 
"[ f]rom its very beginnings Islam was a religion of action rather than 
belief."160 It is not within the scope of this paper to explore the profound 
implications that this has for the Islamic state in the modern world. 
However, it is necessary to understand some of the more specific 
consequences that it has for the criminal law in order to do an analysis of 
rape in the Islamic state of Pakistan. Sandeela161 provides a useful 
analytic framework; he defines the sharia in the following terms -
simultaneously as "Divine Law", "Revealed Law'', "Founded Law", 
"Unchanging Law", "Natural Law", "Comprehensive Law", and "Open 
Textured Law". 
Islam is comprehensive, in that "the sacred or religious law of 
Islam does not only consist of legal rules in the narrow sense, as we 
understand them; it is an all-embracing body of religious duties, the 
totality of Allah s commands that regulate the life of every Muslim in all 
aspects." 162 It is comprehensive in the sense that it incorporates both a 
public and a spiritual function. The public function, which governs the 
158 Supra note 156. 
159 Joseph Schacht in G.E. von Grunebaun, ed., Theology and law in /slam (Weisbaden: 
Otto Harrassowitz, 1971) 3 at 3. 
160 ibid. at 4. 
161 Fateh Sandeela, "The Distinctive Features of Islamic Law" ( 1982) 2 Islamic & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 81. 
162 Supra note 159 at 4. 
164-DALHOUSIEJOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
relationship between men, is connected to the spiritual, which is to 
purify the soul from the baser instincts in preparation for the afterlife. 
The two are connected, as will be demonstrated, through the concept of 
umma or the collective identity of Islam. Under Islam, there is no 
separation of the public and private, as it is understood in North 
American legal culture. 
Islamic law is both revealed and divine law, its primary sources 
being the Qur an, the "True Word of God", and the Sunn a of the Prophet 
Mohammed whose life gave effect to God's rules as they are prescribed 
in the Qur an. The role of.fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence, has been deeply 
influenced by the law's divine aspect: 
There was a suspicion of theological speculation in the minds of many 
leading Muslims. Theological speculation implied the use of human 
reasoning, and it was one thing using one's reasoning to safeguard 
against oneself from unwittingly transgressing Allah '.r commands, as 
the ancient specialist in religious law used to do, and quite a different 
thing trying to pry into the secrets, for instance, of God's nature and 
predestination. 163 
Fiqh is the preeminent Islamic science insofar it elaborated God's divine 
law. "The purpose of .flqh was to produce pious deeds, and not 
familiarity with legal rules and traditional knowledge." 164 It is the 
instrument through which man can obey God's command. Islamic law is 
also founded and unchanging law, insofar as it neither "evolved from 
historical antecedents" 165 nor is evolutionary in character. The law, 
however, is open-textured in that there are few "firm rules", leaving 
space for (jtihad, the exercize of judicial reasoning. 
2. Sources Islamic Criminal Law 
Sharia is the term used to identify the divine law. In particular, it 
refers to "the laws and way of life prescribed by Allah for his 
servants." 166 As has already been stated, the Shari'a is a comprehensive 
system oflaw, which is not simply concerned with prohibitions but with 
163 Ibid. at I 1. 
164 Ibid. at 4. 
165 Supra note I 59 at 83. 
166 University of Southern California, Shari'ah and Fiqu: online (February 28, 1999) 
<http://www.usc.edu.dept/MSA/las/shariahintroduction.html>. 
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issues of "ideology and faith; behaviour and manners; and practical 
daily matter." 167 There are five general sources of Islamic law: 168 the 
Qur an, which is quite literally "the Word of God'', "revealed to the 
Prophet Muhammad for governing man's behaviour" and his "social 
and religious life"; the Szmna, which is "the authentic tradition of the 
Prophet Muhammad" and includes both his "sayings in specific cases 
and his conduct in specific situations"; //ma, which refers to the 
consensus of Muslim scholars; /jtihad, which refers to judicial 
interpretation; and qztisas, which refers to "juristic analogy." 
There is an issue over the legitimacy of modem penal codes, even 
with respect to those that base themselves on the shari a. 169 On the one 
hand, the role of the state is to defend the religion and to enforce God's 
laws. 170 On the other hand, the 01ihodoxy of the penal codes is in 
question. This issue was addressed in Pakistan in the context of the Zina 
Ordi12ance a few years after the law was enacted. 171 In 1981, in Hazoor 
Bakhsh v. Federation qf Paldsta11, the Federal Shariat Court had to 
address the question of whether the punishment of rajm, stoning, is 
ordained in Qur cm for zziia (illicit sexual intercourse). The court took 
the unpopular position that it did not, but their judgment led to a re-
constitution of the court. In 1982, the decision was reconsidered and the 
new court, applying the constitutional-law doctrine of eclipse, 
overturned the earlier decision. 
At a general level, the degree to which the shari'a can and should 
be used as a resource for feminists issues is hotly debated. Abdella 
Doumata states: 
Muslim society has a built in mechanism for promoting the human 
rights of its people, and that is the holy law, the s!?ari 'a. It is a 
mechanism that can be used on behalf of human rights, not because it 
is fixed or God-given, but because it is in fact flexible, allowing for 
167 Ibid 
168 Nagaty Sanad, The Theory of Crime and Crtilli11al Respo11sibilitF i11 Islamic Law 
(Chicago: University of Illinois, 1991) at 38-40. 
169 George Gfeir, "Source of law and the Issue of Legitimacy and Rights" ( 1988) 42 (3) 
Middle East Journal 437. 
170 Bernard G. Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 
1998). 
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interpretation by men and women, and adoptable to changing needs 
and changing cultural understandings. 172 
But Abdella Doumata's view is not a universal one. The first question 
that arises is the extent to which the content of Islamic law can give a 
voice to modern feminist concerns. Some view Islam as inherently 
oppressive to women, citing Qur anic verses that subordinate women to 
their husbands, giving men the right, for instance, to "discipline" their 
wives. Most, however, prefer to focus on the 'revolutionary' aspects of 
the religion, highlighting the fact that the spirit of Islam was to free 
women from the constraints imposed on them in pre-Islamic 
societies. 173 They point to the fact that under Islam, men and women 
were granted equality before God, with women given special status as 
mothers. Moreover, under Islamic law, women were granted legal 
independence, including the right to hold their own property in their 
own name, as well as the right to consent to mmTiage. The second issue, 
closely related to the first, is the extent to which feminists should use 
Islamic law to give voice to their concerns. For Gardezi, 174 for instance, 
women's rights have their origins in secular human rights and the use of 
Islam to justify such rights gives an unwarranted legitimacy to Islamic 
fundamentalism by inadvertently making Islam the framework of 
analysis. 
A third issue that arises is the extent to which the doors of the 
[jtihad - juridical reasoning are open to re-interpretation. 
Traditionally, it has been held that since the third century of hil:A "all 
jurists were... muqallids, that is those whose duty it is to accept the 
opinions of the great predecessors without the exercise of private 
judgment."175 In other words, it was believed that the various schools of 
Islamic thought had been crystallised and the faculty of fjtihad put into 
abeyance. An-na'im argues, however, that: 
172 Eleanor Abdella Doumato, "The Ambiguity of Shari's and the Politics of 'Rights' in 
Saudi Arabia" in Mahnaz Afkani, ed., Faith & Freedom: Women '.r Human Rights 1i1 the 
Mus/tin World (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995) 135 at 153. 
173 See: Jamal Badawi Gender Equity li1 Islam: Basic Principles (Indiana: American Trust 
Publication, 1995); Asghar Ali Engineer The Rights of Women in Islam (New Dehli: Sterling 
Publishers Ltd, 1992). 
174 Fauzia Gardezi, "Islam, feminism, and the women's movement in Pakistan: 1981-91" in 
Kamla Bhasin et. al., eds., Agati!St All Odds: Essays on Women, Religion and DeJJe/opment 
j/'0111 India a!ld Pakistan (New Dehli: Kali for Women, 1994) 51. 
175 J.N.D. Anderson, J:slamic LmF li1 the lvfodem World(London: Stevens & Sons, 1959) at 14. 
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[a]s a product of human interpretation, sharia should be seen as an 
inherently and constantly evolving and changing ethical and legal 
system, and each generation of Muslim men and women have the 
right, indeed obligation ... to contribute to that process in terms of their 
own historical context. 176 
She goes on to say, however, 
that the process of reinterpretation of Islamic sources will not achieve 
significant results if it is confined to marginal 'refonn' with the 
jurisprudential and methodological framework of shari 'a as 
established by the founding jurists, commonly known as usu! al-:fiqh, 
the foundations of Islamic jurisprudence. The process of 
reinterpretation must include the assumptions and methodology of 
traditional formulation, as well as the content of the principles and the 
rules of the shari 'a. 177 
There are also differing opinions among the different schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence regarding the possibility of continuing [jtihad. In 
Pakistan, the government belongs to the Hanqfi school, which has left 
the door open for possible reinterpretation of Islamic law in the context 
of contemporary social conditions. There is a large contingent of Shi'ite 
Muslims within the country who consider the era of fjtihad as having 
closed. The government has thus been inconsistent in its approach, 
variously appealing to fjtihad and applying a strict traditional Shi'ite 
interpretation of the law when it is convenient to do so. Weiss argues 
that the rigid interpretation of the conservative school has dominated the 
programme of legal refonn in Pakistan. 178 
3. Categories of Offences and the Crime of Zina 
There are three categories of crime under Islamic law. Unlike 
western law, which distinguishes wrongful acts in terms of concepts of 
public and private law, Islamic categories directly con-espond to the 
three types of penalties available: hadd (pl. hudud), ta 'zir (pl. ta 'azh), 
and qisas. 179 Hudud punishments, which form the basis for the Islamic 
176 Abdullahi An-na'im, " The Dichotomy between Religious and Secular Discourse is 
Islamic Societies" in Mahnaz Afkhami, ed., Faitl! & Freedom: Womens Human Rigl!ts ti1 tile 
1kfus!?in World (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995) 51 at 58. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Anita M. Weiss, Women in Pakistan: Implications of the Current Program of 
Islamization (Berkley: Working Paper #78, 1985). 
179 For a general survey of the categories of offenses under Islamic Law see: Nagaty Sanad, 
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penal code in contemporary Pakistan, represent the limits of acceptable 
penal sanctions. Hudud is meted out for the commission or omission of 
an act that is in contradiction to any divinely ordained command for 
which a hudud punishment is explicitly laid out. There are seven crimes 
to which hudud punishments are attached: adultery (zina), theft (sariqa), 
banditry (lzaraba), defamation (qadij), transgression (baghi), drinking 
alcohol (shorb al-khamr), and apostasy (ridda). Because hudud crimes 
are regarded as being against God's commands, they are considered 
absolute, rather than discretionary, and they serve as the limits of 
punishment that can be imposed on the ta 'zir category of crime. Ta 'azir 
crimes are those for which the means of punishment is not spelled out in 
the Qur 'an or Sunna and is, instead, left to the discretion of the judge. 
The lawfulness of ta 'zir is indicated by the Tradition of the Prophet. 
Finally, the law of qisas concerns laws of retaliation and blood money. 
The relationship between the offences is an imp01iant one to 
understand. Rosen describes the logic of the hadd-tazir distinction in the 
following manner: 
Acts that are subject to discretionary remedies have in common that 
they break the continuity of a relationship forged by human beings as 
proprietary creatures in such a way that it is nevertheless possible to 
reconstitute ongoing relationships without having to consider their 
impact on society at large. The ha1111 these acts cause is, in a sense, 
limited by the break in continuity of relationship which a properly 
chosen remedy could help to reconstruct. Hadd-type wrongs go 
beyond this boundary insomuch as, in the Islamic concept, they not 
only intrude on a domain marked out by God but because that domain 
is perceived as fraught with vast potential for social chaos. It is a realm 
of acts in which the reconnecting of bonds is regarded as particularly 
difficult and in which the systematic repercussions for many other 
networks of obligation are difficult to foresee and control 180 
The J'he01y of Crime and Criminal Responsibility i11 Islamic Law (Chicago: University of 
Illinois, 1991 ); Mohamed el-Awa F1111ishment i11 Islamic Law (Indianapolis: American Trust 
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Sherwani distinguishes the three offences in the following manner: 
{]isas being a retaliatory measure satisfies the psychological urge of 
revenge; Httdud helps the prevention of crimes by providing severe 
punishment to hardened, incorrigible and habitual criminals and 
deterrence to other notorious members of the community; while Ta zzi· 
aims at reforming the character of the culprit and his rehabilitation in 
the society. 181 
Sherwani's characterization of hadd as based on "the principle of 
deterrence" with "its main objective [being] the prevention of crimes 
and the protection of civil life" 182 is an interesting one because it 
demonstrates the role that hadd punishments play in maintaining the 
Symbolic Order of Islamic society. Sherwani goes on to say that in the 
case of hadd, "the interest of the individual (the criminal in question) 
should, in part, be sacrificed to protect the larger interests of the 
community .. .It is essential to curb the ferocity of crimes for the sake of 
protection of the society." 183 Similarly Rosen states: "the establishment 
of a haddwrong removes the individual from further consideration as a 
person (in the Arab sense) since direct reintegration is regarded as far 
more difficult ... justice is rendered ... by the very act of 
depersonalization .. [or] in the withdrawal of sociality through 
depersonalization." 184 In the case of zzna, where the prescribed 
punishment is death by stoning, the symbolic expression of the law is 
materially significant because: 
[i]n and through the act of stoning, the sense of outrage is at once 
expressed and inculcated. Not only does the individual paiticipate 
directly and deliberately in the administration of justice but also 
affirms his own commitment to its ideal and expectations. Not only 
does he tender his services to the upkeep of the social, political and 
legal ethic, but also trains his own and others' sentiments and 
sympathies aright. Only thus can the moral sense of the community be 
kept keenly alive, and the strength and purpose imparted to the 
administration of justice. 185 
181 A.A.K. Sherwani, The Impact (}/Islamic Pella! Laws oil the Traditio11al Arab Society 
(New Dehli: MD Publications, 1993) at 45. 
182 Ibid at 47. 
183 Ibid at 45. 
1s4 Stipra note 180 at 16. 
185 Fateh Sandeela, "Ethics of Punishment: Islamic and Western Dispensations" in Tahir 
Mahmood et al, eds., Cnimi1al Law tit Islam a11d the Muslim Wodd (Dehli: Institute for 
Objective Studies, 1996) 100 at 113. 
170-DALHOUSIEJOURNALOFLEGAL STUDIES 
In context of symbolic meaning, the distinction between qisas and 
hudud crimes is also an important one to emphasize. The penalties for 
hadd and qisas are prescribed by God and are therefore, to use Weiss' 
language, "a violation of his rights. " 186 With hudud offences, however, 
the interests protected: 
transcend the interests of the individuals qua individuals, and as such 
they can, given the non-recognition of corporate persons be 
maintained only with reference to divine rights. Thus fornication 
... and false accusation of fornication are both offences against God 
because they undermine God's ordaining of marriage as the means for 
legitimate procreation and perpetuation of the family across 
generations. Theft is an offence against God because it militates 
against the security of property upon which the well-being of the 
family and society depends. The drinking of intoxicating beverages is 
an offence against God because it interferes with rationality, which is 
an essential ingredient of social order and of proper worship of God 
and the disposition of the assets that he has conferred upon his human 
creatures. 187 
The qisas offences of homicide and bodily harm, however, fall into the 
category of private law insofar as the effect the individuals' rights vis-a-
vis each other. The difference between these two categories of offences 
is illustrated by the story, reported in the books of Traditions of the boy 
who had the affair with his employer's wife. The father of the boy gave 
one hundred goats and a maid in compensation, which the employer 
accepted. When the case was reported to the prophet, however, he 
ordered the return of the goats and the maid and held both the boy and 
the wife liable to hadd i&s' 
The crime of zziza (illicit sexual intercourse) is seen as the most 
heinous under Islamic law because of the disruption it causes to the 
family, and thereby to the society at large. 189 The Qur 'an says: 
186 Supra note 161 at 181. 
187 Ibid. at 181-2. 
188 S. A. H. Rizvi, G. S. Masoodi & T. Mahmood, "Adultery and Fornication in Islamic 
Criminal Law: A Debate" in Tahir Mahmood et al., eds., Crim1i1al Law tit Islam and tlte 
Muslim World (Dehli: Institute for Objective Studies, 1996) 223 at 226. 
189 There is no shortage of discussion on the crime of zina in the sharia. See in particular: Tahir 
Mahmood et al, eds., Cnimi1al Law i11 Islam and tlte Mttsltin World (Dehli: Institute for Objective 
Studies, 1996); S. Aminul Hasan Rizvi, "Adultery and Fornication in Islamic Law" (1982) 2 
Islamic & Comparative Criminal Law Qumierly 267; G.S. Masoodi, "Punishment in Islam for 
adulte1y and fornication" (1982) 2 Islamic & Comparative Criminal Law Quarterly 275. 
"Nor come nigh to adultery, 
For it is a shameful (deed), 
And evil opening the road 
(To other evils)." 190 
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There numerous references in the primary sources to zina, but there 
is some inconsistency with respect to the appropriate penalties. For 
example, the Qur 'an prescribes: 
"The woman and the man, 
Guilty of adultery or fornication, 
Flog each of them, 
With a hundred stripes." 191 
Despite the Qur 'anic prescription, there are accounts in the Szmna 
of offenders being stoned to death. Traditionally these inconsistencies 
have been resolved by differentiating between muhsan (married) and 
non-muhsan offenders, where stoning was reserved for the former, more 
serious offense. Mayer192 claims, however, that this issue was never 
completely resolved in the flqh and this has led to the emergence of 
different sanctions for zina in the various Islamic states. 
Despite its harsh penalties, the hadd punishment for zina are rarely 
carried out because of the evidentiary burden. In order for hadd to be 
inflicted, either the crime must be confessed to or the act of intercourse 
itself has to be witnessed by four tazkiyah-a!-shuhood(adult, male pious 
witnesses). In addition, qadf?f, or defamation, meaning to falsely charge 
someone with adultery, is also subject to hadd The Qur 'an states: 
"Those who slander chaste women, 
Indiscreet but believing, 
And cursed in this life, 
And in the Hereafter, 
For them is a grievous penalty." 193 
"And those who launch, 
A charge against a chaste woman, 
190 Omar al-Mutrak in Tahir Mahmood et al, eds., Cnimim! Low ti1 /slam one! !Ile 1v/11s!ti11 
World (Dehli: Institute for Objective Studies, 1996) 213. 
191 /bid, at 215. 
192 Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "The Shariah: A Methodology or a Body of Substantive Rules?" 
in Nicholas Heer, ed., /slomic Low 011ti Jurispntc!ence (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1990). 
193 /bid. at 220. 
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And produce not four witnesses, 
(To support their allegations), 
Flog them with eighty stripes; 
And reject their evidence, 
Ever after; for such men are wicked transgressors, 
Unless they repent thereafter, 
And mend (their conduct), 
For God is Oft-Forgiving 
Most Merciful." 194 
Together, these obstacles to proof suggest that the punishment for zina 
has a more symbolic significance than a practical one. It should be noted 
that there is not a separate offence of rape in the primary sources. But 
under Islamic principles of justice, there is a concept of personal 
responsibility, which includes some notion of criminal intent so that the 
rape victim herself cannot be found guilty of zina. 195 
Symbolic Position Women 
In order to understand the internal coherence and logic of Islamic 
law, it is necessary to say a word about the umma, or the collective 
identity of Islam. Memissi argues: 
Individualism, the person's claim to have legitimate interests, views 
and opinions different from the group, is an alien concept and fatal to 
the highly collectivist Islam. Islam like any theocracy, is group-
oriented, and individual wishes are put down as impious, whimsical, 
egotistical passions 196 
Whereas in Western liberalism, where the individual becomes "the basic 
unit of moral, social, political, and legal analysis," 197 in Islam, the 
individual is subsumed within the collective umma. The emphasis on 
personal status as a marker of legal rights is a manifestation of this 
prioritization of the um ma as the proper source for subjective identity. 
H.A.R. Gigg describes the concept best: 
194 /bid at 221. 
195 Sanad, supra note 168. 
196 Fatima Mernissi, "Femininity as Subversion: Reflections on the Muslim Concept of 
Nushuz" in Diana Eck & Devaki Jain, eds., Spealai1g (}/Faith: Cross-Cultural Perspectives O!l 
Women, J?eligioll alld Social Challge (New Dehli: Kali for Women, 1986) 88 at 89. 
197 Supra note 28. 
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In its internal aspect, the Umma consists of the totality of individuals 
bound to one another by ties, not of kinship or race, but ofreligion, in 
that all its members profess their belief in one God, Allah, and in the 
mission of his prophet, Muhammad ... In its external aspect, the Umma 
is sharply differentiated from all other social organizations. Its duty is 
to bear witness to Allah in the relations of its members to one another 
and with all mankind. They form a single indivisible unit charged to 
uphold the true faith, to instruct men in the ways of God, to persuade 
them to be good and to dissuade them from evil by word and deed. 198 
Memissi argues that this concept of umma "transformed a group of 
individuals into a community of believers." 199 Moreover, the politics of 
identity that are occmTing in the Muslim world today draw upon this 
concept of umma, as is demonstrated by what Mernissi calls "the need to 
be Muslim." 
It is important to understand that for Muslims, in canying out the 
precepts of divine law, they are simultaneously bearing witness to Allah 
and preserving the umma, their collective identity. Rosen states: 
For the Arabs it also follows that what matters most in evaluating actions 
is not their connection to a series of abstract propositions that lie behind 
them but to the consequences that actions have in the world, their impact 
on the networks of relationship, those webs of obligation, that one 
constantly encounters reference to the effect that words and deed have in 
the world as the means for assessing what they really are. And in law it is 
the consequences of an act, rather than its antecedent precepts, in terms 
of which a logic ofremedy will be fashioned. Indeed, because the harm 
that people can do varies with their knowledge and hence their 
connections to others the evaluation of the hann itself turns in so small 
part on assessment of a person's situated ties.200 
The purpose of Islamic law is to prevent the social oppression that 
occurs when "the greed and selfishness of the human prey upon 
society."201 Under Islamic law, the notion of social justice depends upon 
"the absolute, just, and coherent unity of existence, and the general, 
mutual responsibility of individuals and societies."202 
198 Quoted from Fatima Mernissa, Beyond !he Veil· 1Wale-Female Dynamics it1 a 1Wodem 
hluslim Society (Toronto: Schenkman Publishing, 1975) at xv. 
199 Ibid. at xiv-xv. 
200 Supra note 180 at 9. 
201 Ibrahim Abdulrahman Tokhais, Social Justice in Islamic law (Michigan: University 
Microfilms International, 1984) at 53. 
202 Ibid. at 52. 
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In Islam, the family and not the individual becomes the primary 
unit of identification, because it is in the family that the collective 
identity of Islam is reproduced. "Prophet Muhammad advised his 
followers to choose their partners carefully because the family .. .is the 
backbone of society."203 It is not surprising, then, that many authors 
have described the family as the "heart of the shari 'a ". Ahmed says of 
Islamic societies that they: 
have remained strictly mmTiage-oriented and conspire relentlessly to 
round up every bachelor into the matrimonial fold. To begin, there is 
Prophet Muhammad's decree that marriage is the only road to 
viriue .. .Islam also prohibits celibacy. The prophet said: 'There is no 
celibacy in Islam. '204 
In Islam, marriage is too important to leave entirely to the whims of the 
individual. In the Hanqfi school, for instance, the concept of a kqfa 'a 
allows a woman's guardian to dissolve a maiTiage contract where the 
girl chooses to marry beneath herself, or more particularly beneath her 
family. 205 Mernissa argues that "[o]ne of the most enduring 
characteristics of [early Islamic] history is that the family structure, 
because divine, is assumed to be unchangeable."206 
One sees God's interest in the family as the social unit extending 
into the area of the criminal law by virtue of the crime of ztiza. Several 
authors have argued that the family was the instrument whereby the first 
Muslim community was founded in Medina because the family 
institution made it possible to organize a "society of believers" by 
disrupting the pre-Islamic tribal system. The goal was to re-orient men's 
allegiances away from the tribe to Allah. This was accomplished by 
replacing the tribe with the collective umma. The primary social unit 
within this collective became the family. There is a growing body of 
research that suggests that in pre-Islamic society, there existed a strong 
matrilineal, matrifocal system of kinship alongside the patrilineal one 
and women's sexual freedom was its defining feature. Such freedom 
203 Ramadan A. Ahmed, "Women in Egypt and the Sudan" in Leonore Leob Adler, ed., 
Women in Cross-Cultural Perspecliw (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991) 107 at 121. 
204 Ibid at 139. 
205 Mona Siddiqui, "Law and the Desire for Social Control: An Insight into the Hanafi 
Concept of Kafa a with Reference to the Fatawa 'Alamgiri (1664-1672)" in Mai Yamani, ed., 
Feminism & Islam: Legal and Litera1y (New York: New York University Press, 1996) 49. 
206 Supra note 197 at xv. 
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served as an impediment to the establishment of the Islamic patriarchal 
structure, so, to use the words of Ghada Karmi, "Islam ensured the 
ascendancy of the patrilineal over matrilineal marriage by condemning 
all forms of the latter as fornication, zina."207 
Memissi argues that: 
because of the novelty of the family structure in Muhammad's 
revolutionary social order, he had to codify in detail its regulations. 
Sex is one the instincts whose satisfaction was regulated at length by 
the religious law during the first years oflslam. The link in the Muslim 
mind between sexuality and the Shari'a has shaped the legal and 
ideological history of the Muslim family structure and consequently of 
the relation between the sexes.208 
Thus, in order to complete a discussion of rape under the Islamic legal 
system, it is necessary to say a few words on the issue of sexuality. It is 
interesting to note that the word zina, in addition to illicit sexual 
intercourse, means "displaying one attractions,"209 "a pleasant setting, 
an omament."210 Bouhdiba links sexuality in Islam with the sacred, 
defining nikah, the proper institution of sexuality, as "a sacred mission 
[that] brings us closer to God."211 "Within the limits of mkah, Islam 
permits, tolerates the sexual life. It integrates it into the social, 
communal life of the umma while warmly recommending believers to 
take their share (nasib) of the sexual pleasures, which are an essential 
prefiguration of the pleasures of paradise."212 "The Islamic view of 
sexuality .. .is a total one. Its aim is to integrate the sexual as everyday 
experience."213 
Whereas the Christian experience with sexuality has largely been 
one of repression, the Islamic view can be best described as reverential. 
This means that not only it is regulated and integrated into everyday 
practice, but it is regarded with a measure of suspicion as the potential 
207 Ghada Karmi, "Women, Islam and Patriarchalism" in Mai Yamani, ed., Fe111i11is111 & 
/slam: Legal a11d Litermy (New York: New York University Press, 1996) 49 at79. 
208 Supra note 197 at xv. 
209 Fazlur Rahman, "Status of Women in Islam" in Guity Nashat, ed., Women and 
Revolzr/10/l !i1 ka11 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983) 37 at 40. 
210 Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, Sexuality i11 /sla111, Alan Sheridan, trans (Boston: Routledge & 
Kega Paul, 1985) at 88. 
211 /bid. at 91. 
212 /bid. at 103-104. 
213 /bid. at 103. 
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source of social chaos, fin ta. It is important to understand that women, as 
the carriers of zina, become the embodiment of .finta. "In Islam ... the 
whole system is based on the assumption that the woman is a powerful 
and dangerous being. All sexual institutions (polygamy, repudiation, 
sexual segregation) can be perceived as a strategy for containing her 
power."214 Thus, far from being repressed, sexuality becomes implicit in 
all interactions between the sexes. 
In Islam, then, family honour becomes closely associated with the 
sexual behaviour of its women. Abu-Odeh argues that the demands of 
the honour/shame society require that the female body becomes 
"inseparable from the performance of virginity" at a social level.215 
Women are required not only to preserve actual virginity, but to produce 
and perform the social affects of such virginity by conforming to the 
prohibitive demands imposed by the society and the law. For abu-Odeh, 
a woman's vaginal hymen metaphorically becomes a social one as well, 
so that even after she marries, she must still virginity and her 
failure to do so is a social, rather than a private issue. Thus, it can be said 
that a woman's body becomes conflated with the body ofislam- and as 
such must be protected from possible contamination. Women's sexual 
practices are regulated and constantly monitored because they become a 
potential source of pollution for the collective umma. 216 
Memissi argues that female subordination in Islam is about the 
protection of the umma, rather than about women themselves. She 
states: 
women's disobedience is so feared in Islam because its implications 
are enormous. They refer to the most dreaded danger to Islam as a 
group psychology: individualism. I want to suggest here that Muslim 
societies resist women's claims to changing status, that they repress 
feminist trends which are actually evident all over the Muslim world, 
and they condemn them as Western imports, not simply because these 
societies fear women, but because they fear individualism. 
rn Mernissa, supra note 189 at xvi. 
215 Lama abu-Odeh, "Crimes of Honour and the Construction of Gender in Arab Societies" 
in Mai Yamani, ed., Feminism & Islam: Legal a!ld litermy (New York: New Tork University 
Press, 1996) 141. 
216 Juliette Minces, The House o/Obedience: fVomm in Arab Socie(F, trans., Micheal Pallis 
(London: Zed Press, 1982) has observed the power and freedom that Islamic woman gain as 
the grow older and attributes this to the fact that they are no longer sexual beings. 
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... the woman, identified in the Muslim order as the embodiment of 
uncontrolled desires and undisciplined passions, is precisely the 
symbol of heavily suppressed individualistic trends, I believe that if 
the issues of the veil are so central to Muslim fundamentalist 
movements today, it is because these movements can be interpreted as 
strong visceral reactions against individualism.217 
An independent woman is considered dangerous in Islam because a 
"women who rebels against her husband, for instance, is also rebelling 
against the umma, against reason order, and indeed, God. The rebellion 
of a woman is linked to individualism, not community (zmzma); passion, 
not reason; disorder, not order; lawlessness (finta) not law."218 Thus, 
when the umma is threatened, the response has traditionally been to 
reinforce women's traditional roles. Bodman observes that "European 
occupation and colonization of Muslim societies tended to magnify the 
practice of women's seclusion; guarding them from foreign eyes 
became a touchstone of the male concept of honour."219 This reaction 
was repeated during the independence movements in the middle part the 
century: 
A key element of the nationalist agenda was the defense of Islamic 
culture. In the early stages of many nationalisms in Muslim societies, 
the social status of women, as more rigidly interpreted over the 
centuries, formed an integral part. The ideology demanded that 
women's bodies symbolize the rejection of an alien culture by 
maintaining traditional customs, such as veiling, deprecating female 
opinion, and subordinating them all to male members of the family. 220 
It should be noted that, in general, women accept their roles as 
'guardians of the culture.' Weiss in describing the institution of purdah, 
which "involves the physical and practical separation of the activities of 
men and women," remarks that "[a]lthough not all women observe the 
restrictions the purdah imposes, most do embrace the inherent values, 
such as that a woman preserves her family's honour by not mixing with 
unrelated men and by not wearing revealing clothing."221 
217 Supmnote 187at89. 
218 Ibid. at 98. 
219 Supmnote 157 at 13. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Supra note 178 at 6. 
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Understanding the symbolic and psychological landscape of the 
honour/shame society is important to understanding rape law in 
Pakistan. Shahla states: 
Pakistani women have for centuries buried in their hearts the rage and 
anguish of rape. In the interests of family honour and for fear of 
ostracism, they were (and still are) forced to keep quiet or face further 
humiliation and abandonment by their families. Pakistani families 
customarily hide the 'shame' of their women whose honour, izzat, has 
been 'looted'. The society has actively discouraged public disclosures 
of rape, and until very recently it preferred not to know. 222 
In Pakistan, the question of rape is both a political and social issue. 
Siddiqi, for instance, describes how the female body became the 
metaphoric battleground where national identity was fought during the 
Bangali-Pakistani war. In the theatre of the collective psyche, women's 
bodies were encoded as the symbolic stage upon which the conflict was 
ultimately acted out: 
In popular plays on the theme of independence ... , the violation of 
individual woman is often portrayed as sacrifice, for family as well as 
for nation. A standard plot revolves around the woman whose husband 
has been incarcerated by the military, who surrenders her body to the 
degradations of army personnel in order to secure her husband's 
freedom. Yet the sacrifice of her body can only be redeemed by her 
exist from the plot, for her act signifies betrayal and shame as well as 
sacrifice. The choice of rejoining the family is rarely exercized; 
ideally, she encounters death through suicide or accident. 223 
Likewise, Shahla describes the emerging phenomenon of "political 
rape" in Pakistan. She argues that such rape is the modem equivalent to, 
and draws its symbolism from, feudal "honour rape" where the "target 
of humiliation and shame is not a particular women, but a political rival 
or an old enemy on whom revenge is to be taken."224 Shahla states: 
the act of rape is more than a show of dominance through brute force 
to keep women in their place. It is also more than an instrument of 
222 Haeri Shahla, "The Politics of Dishonour: Rape and Power in Pakistan" in Mahnaz 
Afkhami, ed., Faith & Freedom: Wome!l s Human Rights !i1 the Jl111slti11 World (New York: 
Syracuse University Press, 1995) 161 at 163. 
223 Dina Siddiqi, "Taslima Nasreen and Others: The Contest over Gender in Bengladesh" in 
Herbert Bodman & Nayereh Tohidi, eds., Women !i1 kftrs!ti11 Soieites: Diversity With!i1 Unify 
(Boulder: Lynnes Reiner Publishers, 1998) 205 at 209. 
224 Ibid. at 162. 
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oppression to restrict women's movement and control their bodies. 
Nor is it merely to make public examples of raped women in order to 
strike in the hearts of other women, thus forcing them to obey the rules 
of male power structure, and to remain within certain culturally and 
religiously specified boundaries. While sharing aspects of these 
elements, the specificity of the cases of these three women involves an 
act of revenge aimed at dishonouring a powerful and potentially 
threatening rival... When female members of her party are raped, not 
only are individual women dishonoured, but symbolically Benazir 
Bhutto herself, the leader of the opposition and the model of 
womanhood, is 'raped' by association. How could a nation, any 
nation, choose to have a raped leader? Conversely, how could a leader 
who is unable to protect herself or her followers protect her country 
from being invaded by its 'enemies', real or imagined?225 
It is interesting to note that, according to Shahla, "political rape" has the 
tacit acceptance of the Pakistani government. 
5. Islamization of Pakistan and the Crime of Rape 
In the years following partition, Islamic principles have 
increasingly been incorporated in the state's legal apparatus, but it was 
not until the Zia government came into power in February 1979, that the 
systematic process of Islamization, which involved "bringing all laws 
into confonnity with Islamic tenets and values" and to "mandate the 
kind of political and social institutions that had been established and 
encouraged by the Prophet Mohammed," began.226 Several authors have 
theorized that tensions resulting from processes of modernization have 
led to the current strategies of Islamization. Mernissa argues, for 
instance, that 
the primary issue being debated in the Muslim world today is 
democracy-the individual right to choose society's rulers. The right 
of each citizen to choose those who rule, through clear voting 
procedures, is a total reversal of the idea of personhood in Islam. It is 
the world upside-down.227 
In Pakistan these tensions are complicated by the context in which the 
Pakistani state emerged - Pakistan was created by the Islamic minority 
in India who demanded a separate state in which their community 
225 ibid at 170. 
226 Anita Weiss, Slfpra note 178 at 7. 
227 Supra note 197 at 90. 
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"could practice their religion as they pleased-not only in private and 
family life, but also, perhaps, in the very organization of society and its 
institutions."228 Thus, Islamization has been characterized as the raison 
d'etre of the Pakistani state.229 Recently, Islamization is, in large part, a 
reaction to the processes of Western modernization. For those who insist 
that Pakistan be transformed into an Islamic state in the traditional sense 
of the word, it is because they see it as an alternative to the modern, 
capitalist state in which "men and women are virtually encouraged ... to 
indulge in dishonesty or illicit sex. "230 
In February 1979, the Zia government took the first concrete step 
towards Islamization in Pakistan with the introduction of the Hudood 
Ordinance 1979 Under this Ordinance, the sharia offences of theft, 
drunkenness, zina (illicit sexual intercourse), and the bearing of false 
witness have become offences against the state, and, where the 
necessary burdens of proof have been met, subject to hadd Adultery, 
fornication and rape are all captured under the Zzi1a Ordinance and the 
evidentiary burden requires the testimony of four tazikyah-a!-
shuhoocf"1 who have witnessed actual penetration. Alternatively, ztna 
can be established by confession. When the requirements of haddhave 
not been met, the offence attracts the lessor ta 'zir punishment. 
According to the legal definition, zina occurs when an adult woman 
and an adult man willfully commit sexual intercourse without being 
validly maITied to each other. Distinctions between fornication and 
adultery are relevant only in the context of sentencing, whereby the 
penalty for muhsan is death by stoning and for non-muhsan 100 lashes. 
Rape, zina-bi!-jabr occurs when a person has sexual intercourse with a 
man or women, to whom he or she is not malTied in any of the following 
circumstances: a) against the will of the victim; b) without the consent of 
the victim; c) with the consent of the victim, when the consent has been 
obtained by putting the victim in fear of death or of hurt; or, d) where the 
228 Norman Anderson, Law Re/onn in the FVork/ (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 
1976) at 174. 
229 Ibid 
210 Ibid at 180. 
231 Rubya Mehdi, "The Offence of Rape in Pakistan" in Jennifer Temkin, eds., Rape and 
the Cnini11al Justice System (Brookfield: Dartmouth, 1995), defines !azilcyah-a/-shuhood as 
"truthful male persons free from sin" - a hard standard to meet. 
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consent is given because the victim believes that the offender is another 
person to whom the victim is or believes herself or himself to be validly 
married. 
Not surprisingly, the evidentiary burden required to attract the 
hadd punishment has proved, difficult to meet. In order to be found 
guilty under hadd of zina or the act would have to be done 
in public in the presence of four upstanding members of the community. 
Typically, then, zina is prosecuted as ta 'zir, and punishment is at the 
discretion of the comt. It should be emphasized that under ta a 
variety of types of evidence can be admitted, including the testimony of 
women.232 Judicial discretion, however, has proven potentially perilous 
for women who are unable to substantiate their claims. In the well-
known Safia Bibi case, for example, a young, blind women who was 
working as a domestic servant became pregnant after being raped by her 
employer and his son. The men were not punished - the first was not 
charged for lack of evidence and the second was acquitted on the benefit 
of doubt. Bibi, however, was found guilty of zina-bif..:Jabr on the 
evidence of illegitimate pregnancy or "self-confession", and was 
sentenced to 15 lashes. The Federal Shariat Court eventually reversed 
the ruling, distinguishing between rape and adultery, and dismissed 
Safia Bibi's sentence.233 Since medical evidence is often not available to 
substantiate claims of rape, offenders are generally released for lack of 
evidence. The victims of rape, on the other hand, are often subject to 
prosecution because either their allegations of rape or subsequent 
pregnancy is treated as a confession of zina. Thus, the Zina Ordinance 
has increasingly been used as a mechanism of social control. The 
Human Rights Global Watch Report on Womens Human Rights, for 
instance, states: 
the vast majority of Huc!ooc!cases (most of which are registered by the 
woman's husband or father) are not supp01ied by the evidence and 
should not have been prosecuted. In many cases, women are 
wrongfully prosecuted for Huc!ooc! offences because they refuse to 
232 Human Rights Global Watch, in its Report 011 Wome11 '.f Huma11 Rig/tis, /995 reports 
that many of the same biases that have historically been in exhibited in Western courts are 
prevalent in the Pakistan courts. A version of the fresh complaint rule, for example, can be 
found in the Pakistan Penal Code. In addition, in the absence of physical evidence of 
resistance, the courts are more likely to treat the intercourse as consensual. 
233 See ibid. Several other cases are reported by the agency at 150-151. 
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marry men chosen by their families, decide to leave home or marry 
men against their parents' will, or seek to separate from or divorce 
abusive husbands.234 
It has been estimated that two thousand women are sitting in prison on 
false rape charges. 235 The problem, of course, has to do with the 
conflation of rape and adultery in the submission in evidence and the use 
of the victim's testimony of rape as evidence of a 'confession.' 
6. Feminist Strategies respecting the Pakistani Rape Law 
Deciding on appropriate strategies for law reform in Pakistan 
always involves an implicit debate as to whether the criminal law should 
be secularized and religion made a 'private affair.' For the most part, 
however, the political climate will not allow such a reconceptualization. 
Currently, the trend in Pakistan is towards greater Islamization, rather 
than less, where an accepted political strategy is to say one is more 
Muslim then his opponent. 236 As one feminist argues, in a country where 
the Muslim majority represents over ninety percent of the population, 
Islam is a source of unity, "something upon which we can all agree."237 
Human rights discourses, on the other hand, are seen as Western and 
antithetical to Islamic Pakistan. Thus the most effective strategies for 
improving women's positions in Pakistan inevitably involve working 
within Islam itself. 
The basic strategy for Muslim feminist is reinterpretation of Islam 
law at both a macro and a micro level. At a macro level, this means that 
women are beginning to emphasize the spirit of Islam, and the position 
given to them in the collective umma. It means going back to the primary 
sources and reinterpreting, retranslating Islamic verses. More 
importantly, however, it also means revealing the ways in which current 
social practices contradict what has been 'revealed' by the []ur an and 
the Prophet Muhammad. In the context of Pakistani rape laws, the 
emphasis is on the appropriation and misapplication of Islamic law in 
ways that are meant to subordinate women, rather than to obey Allah s 
divine command. At a micro level, women are returning to the particular 
234 Ibid. at! 51. See also Amnesty International External Archive online: (3 March 1990) 
http://www.amnesty.se/ aixweb97 / 405 e.htm. 
235 Hebert, supra note 156. 
2i6 Ibid. 
2i1 Ibid. 
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Islamic prescriptions and seeking reinterpretation. The difficulty, in the 
context of the hadd offences, and in particular in the case of zina, is the 
symbolic significance that these laws have in the construction of the 
Islamic identity. There is also the issue of the apparent "explicitness" of 
the language of the texts and the general consensus reached on these 
provisions by the early jurists infiqh. To what extent are the doors of 
fjtihad still open? 
Legal reform obviously requires a restructuring of the Zina 
Ordinance. Thus, Quaishi238 maintains that rape should not be 
subsumed under zina at all. She argues that rape is more analogous to the 
hadd offence of hiraba or "violent undertaking" than to zina. 
Traditionally, hiraba has been translated as "forcible taking", "highway 
robbery", "terrorism'', or "waging war against the state" and has 
generally been interpreted by the scholars to include "any type of 
forcible assault upon people involving some sort of taking of property. It 
differs from theft in that the Qur 'anic crime of theft (sariqa) is taking by 
stealth whereas hiraba is taking by force." Alternatively, she argues that 
there is textual support for treating rape as subject to civil liability 
(quisas), for "wounds" or "hann to sexual organs" (/kah). Interestingly, 
there seems to be some support for this approach under Iranian law.239 
Quraishi, however, although grounding her arguments in the 
primary texts, implicitly uses the language of secular human rights in 
her arguments. She states, for instance, that "[i]n the face of any hint of 
a woman's sexual impropriety, the Qur'anic response is: walk away. 
Leave her alone. Leave her dignity in tact. The honour of a women is not 
a tool, it is herfimdamenta! right,, [emphasis added]. Moreover, her 
criticisms of the placement of rape within the Zina Ordinance are 
conceptually based on the idea that, because the {]ztr 'an requires four 
witnesses to the act and defamation is punishable by hadd, the crime of 
zina is really a crime of "public indecency." Although this is true in a 
practical sense, and she is right to criticize the way shari 'a evidence 
requirements are being used by men as instruments to terrorize and 
238 Asifa Quraishi, Her Honour: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Laws of Pakistan from a 
Woman-Sensitive Perspective: online (March3, 1999) <http://www.untada.com/Karamah/ 
publications/rape_main.htm>. 
239 Mahnaz Afkhami and Erika Friedl, eds., "The Islamic Penal Code of the Islamic Repblic 
of Iran: excepts relating to women" in /;1 tile Eye o/"tl!e Storm: !f/ome!l ill Post-Revo!ut1011a1y 
ftu!l (London: I.B. Tauris)l80. 
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oppress women, her characterization of zina as a simple "act of 
indecency" serves to undermine her argument in Islamic Pakistan. It is a 
theoretical position that cannot be justified given the symbolic 
significance that hadd offences have in the creation of the collective 
umma. Moreover, she underestimates the importance that women, as a 
symbol of cultural purity, play in the Islamic psyche. 
The proper vehicle for legal reform is till being debated in Pakistan. 
The challenge of such reform is to find a way of characterizing the crime 
of rape in a way that is sensitive to the fundamentalist nature of Pakistani 
law and the special status given to women's sexuality within the context 
of an Islamic society. 
v. FINAL THOUGHTS 
(Tjhere is 110 /i11al word co11cemi11g the political status ()f sexual 
struggles ... Neither wholly a source of dom1i1atio11 11or of resistance, 
sexuality is 11either outside power nor wholly c1i-cz1mscribed by it. 
Instead, ti is ilse(f an arena of struggle. There are 110 inherently 
liberat01y or repressive sexual practices, for any practice is co-
optable and a11y is capable of becoming a source ()fresista11ce. No 
In all three countries - Finland, Canada, and Pakistan - rape law 
has emerged as a site of gender conflict and negotiation. But in each 
case, the way in which the battle is articulated, as well as the terms of its 
engagement, is culturally specific. The way in which rape is culturally 
understood and personally experienced is, of course, a product of the 
sexual culture in which the act occurs. But sexual assault laws because 
of the inherent gendered nature of these offenses necessarily impact 
sexual culture. Law is always culturally symbolic. This is why feminists 
must inevitably embark on a dialogue with the law. In this dialogue, law 
becomes a site of gender renegotiation with its te1ms defined by the legal 
culture in which it takes place. In all three countries examined both the 
definition of the legal problem of rape and feminist strategies for refonn 
have been and continue to be shaped by the criminal law culture in 
which they are situated. 
240 Sawicki, supra note 38 at 184. 
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In Canada, feminists have explicitly engaged in and initiated legal 
reform. The reform has been an evolutionary process with both 
legislators and courts responding to feminist critiques as they emerge. 
There have been two generations of critique since the 1970s. The 
process of reform was initially spurred by feminist demands that it 
should be woman's experience ofrape that forms the content of the law. 
In this early period, the feminist strategy was to divorce the crime of 
rape from its sexual quality. This was seen as necessary as the traditional 
legal framework had privileged an inherently androcentric sexual 
standpoint that disadvantaged women complainants in the comiroom. 
The second generation of critique, however, would see the rape-as-sex 
characterization re-emerge as a way of once again redefining the crime 
of rape. Informed by the American rape debate, the distinguishing 
feature of the Canadian reform process has been the emphasis on the 
definition of rape. This has proved to be a divisive issue for feminists. 
Liberal feminist have generally seen rape as a violent act, whereas 
radical feminists see rape as somehow implicated in normal gender 
relations and the prevailing norms of heterosexuality. Thinkers like 
Catherine MacKinnon, for instance, have argued that male power has 
been eroticized in contemporary North American society. The challenge 
for legal reformers has been how to respond to these criticisms in and 
through existing conceptual frameworks like legal liberalism. In other 
words, how can law be used, as an "instrument of truth", to disrupt 
existing social scripts? The courts have recently responded with a new 
conceptual framework for understanding rape, a framework that is 
implicitly infonned by the second generation of feminist critique. The 
law is still evolving, however, and how this new model will impact on 
existing legal principles in still unknown. 
Reform in Finland has taken place within a penal philosophy that 
emphasizes decriminalization and abolitionism. Within this structure, 
the rape reforms are anomalous to the larger penal reform movement in 
that they actually increased the scope of judicial jurisdiction. Like in 
Canada, the changes to the law are too recent for one to know for certain 
what their practical effects will be. What is interesting about the Finnish 
reforms is the way in which they have been, in large part, a response to 
the emerging feminist discourse of 'woman's law.' The challenge for 
Finnish feminists has been to find a way of articulating the crime of rape 
so as not to disrupt a culture of gender harmony. 'Woman's law' has 
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provided feminists with the discursive space to address issues, such as 
violence against women, that have traditionally been taboo within the 
conceptual framework of 'equality between the sexes'. It is important to 
note that the central issue for legal reformers in Finland has been 
somewhat different than it has been for reformers in Canada. In Finland, 
the focus has been on problems of evidence and issues oflegal definition 
which arise within the context of solving these evidentiary problems. 
Within the discourse of 'woman's law', however, new issues may 
emerge, such as 'what is the appropriate level of fault required for 
conviction?' The question becomes, 'whose understanding of events 
should be emphasized?' 
In order to understand the rape laws in Pakistan one must have an 
understanding of the nature and scope oflslam and the special status that 
women's sexuality occupies within fundamentalist Pakistan. Human 
rights activists have continually demanded a repeal of the Zina 
Ordinance on the basis that it is discriminatory to women and an affront 
to basic human rights. However, the language of human rights, with its 
emphasis on individualism, is problematic in the context of the 
increasing Islamization of the Pakistani state. The better approach, 
rather than to apply the human rights conceptual model, would be to 
search for strategies of change within the body of Islam itself. This 
approach may involve a juristic re-characterization of the crime of rape. 
The gender struggle in Pakistan is particularly salient, because it 
involves, at its most basic level, issues of collective identity. Therefore, 
strategies of change, if they are to be successful, must involve not only 
reinterpretation of the primary sources of law, but must take account of 
the symbolic significance of the existing legal regime. The proper 
characterization of rape must be found within this framework. 
The purpose of this paper has been to provide a cross-cultural 
examination of the law of rape in order to come to some understanding 
of the way in which rape is both a social and a legal discourse. Engaging 
in such comparative analysis can bring greater understanding of one's 
own cultural and legal paradigms. This work has illustrated, for 
instance, that the philosophical inquiry surrounding the definition of 
rape as it has emerged within Canada and the United States is unique to 
the North American cultural context where liberal legalism with its 
emphasis on individualism and abstract autonomy prevails. In Finland 
and Pakistan, more communitarian legal visions produce sexual assault 
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laws and processes of legal reform very different than those seen in 
Canada. In all three countries examined, the way in which rape is legally 
defined is significant for the way gender relations are constructed. In 
each case the definition of rape is the result of a synergistic exchange 
between culture and law. Understanding this synergy is important in the 
development of effective strategies of resistance both within and outside 
of law. In this paper, for instance, making visible liberalism as the 
dominant legal form in Canada highlights alternative legal visions such 
as communitarianism. It can be argued that incorporating such 
communitarian values into Canadian Constitutional principles such as 
'fair trial', 'fundamental justice' and 'full answer and defense' would be 
a significant progressive step to legal reform in Canada. Engaging in 
comparative analyses is thus an important area of inquiry for feminist 
researchers. The last word goes to Jennifer Nedelsky who states: 
Feminists are centrally concerned with freeing women to shape our 
own lives, to define who we (each) are, rather than accepting the 
definition given to us by others (men and male dominated society, in 
particular). Feminists therefore need a language of freedom with 
which to express the value underlying this concern. But that language 
must also be true to the equally important feminist precept that any 
good theorizing will start with people in their social contexts.241 
241 Supra note 40. 
